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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Plaintiff-Appellee Uintah Basin Medical Center ("UBMC") offers this statement of 
issues and the standard of review in lieu of the one contained in the Opening Brief of 
Defendant-Appellee Leo W. Hardy, M.D. ("Dr. Hardy") because it more accurately 
characterizes the issues presented to the trial court and the standard of review to be 
applied by this Court.1 
L Did the trial court properly award summary judgment to Plaintiff-Appellee 
UBMC on the basis that the pathology services agreement between UBMC and Dr. Hardy 
(the "Agreement") was voidable because it impermissibly bound successor Boards of 
Trustees of UBMC? 
2. Regardless of which standard governs whether a contract may bind a 
successor governmental board, did the trial court correctly determine that UBMCs 
termination of the Agreement was lawful? 
1
 Because it is Dr. Hardy's duty, as the Appellant, to establish that he 
properly preserved the issues raised in this appeal, see Utah R. App. P. 24(5), we note 
only where Dr. Hardy failed to preserve certain issues. 
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3. Is a governmental board partly made up of appointed officials or officials 
whose terms are staggered exempt from the general rule restricting governmental officials 
from contracting beyond their terms? 
4. Must the majority of the board have been replaced to apply the general 
rule? 
5. Does the Agreement's subject matter or its "just cause" provision preclude 
enforcement of the general rule? 
6. May Dr. Hardy raise an argument concerning ratification that was not 
argued before the trial court and does the principle of ratification preclude a governmental 
entity from voiding a contract entered into by its predecessor where the contract no longer 
serves the needs of the community? 
a. Preservation of Issue: Dr. Hardy did not preserve this issue in the 
trial court. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the trial court's summary judgment ruling 
for correctness. See Surety Underwriters v.E&C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338, 340 (Utah 
2000). In evaluating a summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the Court considers only whether the trial court correctly concluded that 
no disputed issues of material fact existed and correctly applied the law. See id. 
#98247 v2 3 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-26-1. Jurisdiction transferred to commissioners. 
All county hospitals established under Chapter 106, Laws of 1917, shall 
hereafter be under the jurisdiction of the county legislative body, and the 
office of trustees therefor is abolished. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-50-302. General County Powers. 
(1) A county may: 
(a) as prescribed by statute, levy, assess, and collect taxes, borrow 
money, and levy and collect special assessments for benefits 
conferred; and 
(b) provide services, exercise powers, and perform functions that are 
reasonably related to the safety, health, morals and welfare of their 
inhabitants, except as limited or prohibited by statute. 
(2) A county may: 
(a) sue and be sued; 
(b) acquire land, including at a tax sale, and hold it as necessary and 
proper for county purposes; 
(c) make such contracts and purchase and hold such personal property as 
may be necessary to the exercise of its powers; and 
(d) manage and dispose of its property as the interests of its inhabitants 
may require. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4). Definitions. 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, 
operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity 
whether or not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or 
undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a 
core governmental function, unique to government, 
undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a 
government or governmental function, or could be performed 
by private enterprise or private persons. 
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any 
department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a 
governmental entity. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1). Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, 
or other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program 
conducted in either public or private facilities. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
UBMC commenced this action over four years ago by filing a request for 
declaratory relief pertaining to its rights under the Agreement it entered into with Dr. 
Hardy in December of 1994. Although the Agreement was subject to termination for 
"just cause," it was otherwise perpetual in nature. Believing that it had just cause, 
UBMCs Board of Trustees (the "Board") provided Dr. Hardy with ninety days' written 
notice that it had elected to terminate the Agreement. After reviewing the pathology and 
related medical needs of Duchesne County, the Board concluded that services beyond 
those provided by Dr. Hardy under the Agreement were required. 
Dissatisfied with UBMCs termination of the potentially perpetual Agreement, Dr. 
Hardy responded to UBMCs complaint by leveling a counterclaim against it and 
engaging UBMC in litigation that has now endured for over four years. Although the trial 
court initially denied both parties' motions for summary judgment, the parties renewed 
their summary judgment motions following additional discovery. This time, the trial 
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court carefully evaluated the legal principles at issue and concluded that no material fact 
issues existed and that UBMC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
There is no question that UBMC, a hospital owned and operated by Duchesne 
County, was within its rights in terminating the Agreement. The law is well established 
that governmental entities generally may not bind their successors to long-term contracts. 
The policy underlying this rule, which is of particular importance in this case, is that 
governing boards must be able to adapt to the evolving needs of the communities they 
serve. In this case, UBMC's Board, which is duty-bound to serve the health care needs of 
Duchesne County, properly employed its discretion to terminate the Agreement. UBMC 
therefore respectfully asks the Court to affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment 
in its favor. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On October 29, 1996, UBMC filed a declaratory judgment action against Dr. 
Hardy in the Eighth Judicial District Court in and for Duchesne County. See R. at 1-4. 
Dr. Hardy responded by filing an Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint on 
December 9, 1996. See id. at 10-22. Dr. Hardy's counterclaim against UBMC alleged 
that UBMC's termination of the Agreement constituted a material breach because no "just 
cause" existed for the termination. See id. at 14. Dr. Hardy asserted a Third-Party 
Complaint for intentional interference with economic relations against Dr. Thomas J. 
Allred, see id. at 15, and Dr. Allred subsequently filed a counterclaim against Dr. Hardy. 
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However, Dr. Allred dismissed his counterclaim against Dr. Hardy with prejudice on 
August 2, 1999.2 See id. at 470-71. 
On June 22, 1998, Dr. Hardy filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on his 
breach of contract counterclaim against UBMC. See id. at 168-70. Approximately one 
month later, UBMC filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on its declaratory 
judgment claim. See R. at 268-70. On October 19, 1998, the trial court denied both Dr. 
Hardy's motion for summary judgment and UBMCs cross motion for summary judgment, 
ruling that factual issues precluded such relief. See id. at 410-12. 
Following additional discovery, Dr. Hardy and UBMC entered into a Joint 
Stipulation with respect to certain facts, a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum 
A. See id. at 511-517. Dr. Hardy filed a Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
on his claim against UBMC on October 1, 1999. See id. at 518-20. UBMC then renewed 
its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on its claim for declaratory relief. See id. at 
524-26. At the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the court made the 
following findings: 
(1) Dr. Hardyfs contract to provide pathology services was an 
enforceable contract under Utah law. 
(2) The contract was terminable for "just cause." 
(3) Whether Plaintiff [UBMC] had "just cause" to terminate the contract 
would be a question for the jury. 
2
 Dr. Allred filed a motion for summary judgment on January 18, 2000, 
which the trial court granted by Order dated May 18, 2000. See R. at 1067-68. Dr. Hardy 
has not appealed this disposition. 
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R. at 1053; Addendum A to Appellant's Opening Brief at 1. However, at the request of 
Dr. Hardy, the court reserved the issue of whether the Agreement was voidable because it 
impermissibly bound successor Boards of UBMC, and the court permitted the parties to 
provide supplemental briefs on the issue.3 Id. at 1054. 
After receiving the parties' supplemental briefs, the trial court entered a summary 
judgment ruling in favor of UBMC on April 6, 2000, concluding that "the contract in 
question is voidable with or without 'just cause' simply because it could not bind 
successor Boards." Id. Accepting UBMC's arguments on this point, the court stated: 
There are many policy reasons why a health care provider would contract 
for pathology services such as entered into with the Plaintiff and Dr. Hardy. 
Due to the rapid advance of science, medicine changes and needs of 
patients[,] there should be no reason for such an agreement to continue into 
3
 Dr. Hardy's implication that UBMC unfairly surprised him by raising the 
issue of whether a governmental contract is terminable by successor boards for the first 
time in its reply brief is wholly unfounded. First, UBMC argued, in its memorandum in 
support of its renewed cross-motion for summary judgment, see R. at 527-62, that 
perpetual contracts are particularly disfavored in a governmental setting and that, because 
it contained no term of duration, the Agreement was terminable "at will." Alternatively, 
UBMC argued that the court should infer a reasonable lerm of two years and rule that the 
termination was lawful because the parties had performed for two years. UBMC also 
argued that, particularly in light of its determination that the public's health, welfare and 
interest would be better served by a full-time doctor who could perform the dual functions 
of pathology and emergency medicine, its need to respond to the health care requirements 
of the public precluded it from being bound to a perpetual contract. These arguments are 
substantially similar to the issues presented on appeal. Second, UBMC raised the 
argument relating to the termination of contracts by successor governmental boards in 
direct response to an argument made by Dr. Hardy, and UBMC based its argument on 
cases cited by Dr. Hardy in his brief. See id. at 583-620. Finally, as mentioned above, 
the trial court gave Dr. Hardy the opportunity to respond to the argument by permitting 
him to file a supplemental brief on the issue. Dr. Hardy's attempt to characterize UBMC's 
argument as some type of subterfuge should be rejected. 
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the future or be binding on successor Boards where the governing Board is 
a governmental entity. 
Id. The court also rejected Dr. Hardyfs argument based on the idea that UBMCs Board 
members serve staggered terms. According to the court, f,[i]n the year the termination 
was made there had been three new appointments and therefore a new Board." Id. An 
Order memorializing the Court's ruling was entered on May 18, 2000. See id. at 1069-73; 
Addendum B to Appellant's Br. Dr. Hardy filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's 
summary judgment ruling on June 5, 2000. See id. at 1083-85. 
C. Statement of Facts 
UBMC is a county hospital owned and operated by Duchesne County. See R. at 
304. According to statute, the ultimate responsibility for UBMC lies with the Duchesne 
County Commission. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-26-1. The hospital is governed by a ten-
member Board of Trustees, nine of whom are voting members. Seven of the members of 
are appointed by the Duchesne County Commission. See R. at 1100, pp. 11, 58. Three of 
the members—a Duchesne County Commissioner, the Chief of the Medical Staff, and the 
Hospital Administrator—serve on the Board in an ex officio capacity, with the Hospital 
Administrator having no voting rights. See UBMC Bylaws, R. at 993-1002; Addendum 
D to Appellant's Br. Between the time when UBMC entered into the Agreement and the 
termination date, three of the seven appointed members and one ex officio member of the 
Board had been replaced. See R. at 1038, 1044-45. Two months after Dr. Hardy 
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discontinued his performance under the Agreement, five appointed and two ex officio 
members, including the County Commissioner, had been replaced. See id. 
UBMCs Board entered into the Agreement with Dr. Hardy on or about December 
12, 1994, but the effective date was August 1, 1994. The Agreement provided that Dr. 
Hardy would supply pathology services to UBMC on a part-time, mostly off-site basis. 
See id. at 20-21; Addendum C to Appellant's Br. The Agreement does not contain a term 
of duration but states that it meets the needs of UBMC "at this time" and that it can be 
terminated for "just cause." R. at 22. More specifically, the Agreement provides that it 
would "become effective August 1, 1994 and continue to bind the parties to the terms 
until terminated after ninety days written notice for just cause of termination by either 
party or by mutual consent of the parties to a shorter notice period." Id. For 
approximately two years following the effective date of the Agreement, Dr. Hardy 
provided on-site services to UBMC for an average of about eight hours per month. See 
id. at 113-114, n.l. He also provided off-site services from his laboratory at Castleview 
Hospital in Price, Utah. See id. 
In July of 1996, UBMCs Board held at least two discussions relating to the 
medical needs of Duchesne County at regularly scheduled board meetings. Copies of the 
meeting minutes dated July 11, 1996, and July 18, 1996, are attached hereto as Addenda 
B and C, respectively. See R. at 296-97; 298-307. Although the meeting minutes 
indicate that the Board generally was satisfied with Dr. Hardyfs performance, the Board 
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ultimately determined that the health, welfare, and interests of the citizens of Duchesne 
County would be better served by providing full-time, on-site pathology services through 
a physician who would live in the community and also assist in providing much needed 
emergency medicine services. See Addendum C. Accordingly, on July 29, 1996, Bradley 
D. LeBaron, the Hospital Administrator of UBMC and an ex officio member of the Board, 
sent a letter to Dr. Hardy informing him that the Agreement was terminated effective 
ninety days from the date of the letter. See R. at 22. A copy of Mr. LeBaron's letter is 
attached hereto as Addendum D. Dr. Hardy continued performing services for UBMC 
until October 28, 1996, approximately ninety days after the date of Mr. LeBaronfs letter. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
UBMC respectfully asks the Court to affirm the trial court's entry of summary 
judgment in its favor. The trial court's ruling was based upon the general rule prohibiting 
governmental entities from binding their successors to long-term contracts. In 1957, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that the rule was applicable only to contracts reflecting the 
entity's exercise of governmental functions, not its exercise of proprietary functions. 
However, the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions has been 
widely criticized in other states and Utah courts have leveled strong criticism against the 
distinction in applying the law of governmental immunity. Viewed in this broader 
context, the trial court properly refused to apply the governmental-proprietary distinction 
to the facts of this case, concluding that the general rule precluded UBMC's Board from 
#98247 v2 
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binding its successors to the long-term Agreement with Dr. Hardy. Furthermore, even if 
the trial court had applied the governmental-proprietary distinction in this case, the court's 
ruling would have remained the same, and Dr. Hardy has not even suggested that any 
genuine issues of material fact should have precluded the court's summary judgment. The 
operation of county health care facilities such as UBMC generally qualifies as a 
governmental function, and UBMC's status as the only hospital in the rural county of 
Duchesne bolsters this conclusion. 
Dr. Hardy also argues that the governmental-proprietary distinction should be 
replaced with an inquiry into whether an agreement hinders successor boards in the 
performance of policymaking. Regardless of which standard this Court adopts, UBMC's 
decision to terminate the Agreement was lawful. UBMC's duty to provide adequate 
health care to the citizens of Duchesne County and to make policy to further that end 
required the discretion of its Board to remain unfettered. 
Finally, none of Dr. Hardy's claimed exceptions precludes the application of the 
general rule in this case, nor are any of the claimed exceptions well supported by law. 
With respect to the characteristics of the Board, neither the fact that its members are 
appointed nor the fact that they serve staggered terms permits the Board to bind its 
successors in perpetuity. The nature of the Agreement also does not preclude application 
of the rule. Dr. Hardy's argument concerning ratification is equally unavailing in light of 
his failure to raise it before the trial court. Moreover, the ratification doctrine is 
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inapplicable in this case because the rule does not preclude governmental boards from 
terminating contracts when they become inappropriate to serve the needs of the public. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Properly Refused to Apply the Standard Set Forth in Bair 
and, Because the Provision of Healthcare Services Qualifies as a 
Governmental Function, the Agreement Was Voidable in Any Event. 
Dr. Hardy first contends that the trial court failed to follow the precedent 
established by this Court almost fifty years ago in Bair v. Layton City Corporation, 307 
P.2d 895 (Utah 1957). At the same time, however, Dr. Hardy readily acknowledges that 
the standard set forth in Bair is "difficult to decipher and even more difficult to apply," 
and he urges the Court to adopt an alternative standard. See Appellant's Br. at 21. What 
Dr. Hardy fails to fully articulate is that courts have widely criticized the governmental-
proprietary distinction applied in Bair and that both subsequent Utah case law and the 
Utah Legislature have overruled the distinction in the context of governmental immunity. 
As a result, the trial court's refusal to apply the test was proper. Even assuming that the 
Bair standard remained viable in the State of Utah, the trial court properly determined 
that the Agreement was voidable because it reflected the Board's performance of a 
governmental function. For these reasons, UBMC respectfully requests the Court to 
affirm the trial court's summary judgment. 
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A. The Trial Court Properly Refused to Apply the Governmental-Proprietary 
Analysis in Light of Pervasive Criticism of the Analysis and the State of 
Utah's Abandonment of the Analysis for Purposes of Governmental 
Immunity. 
Even though Dr. Hardy advocates the adoption of a test different from the one set 
forth in Bair, he nevertheless argues that the trial court's failure to analyze the Agreement 
under Bair was erroneous and warrants reversal. Numerous courts across the country 
have abandoned the governmental-proprietary distinction for all purposes, including the 
determination of whether governmental contracts may bind successor boards. Moreover, 
Utah courts and the Utah Legislature appear to be gravitating in the same direction and 
have expressly abolished the standard articulated in Bair for purposes of governmental 
immunity. Under these circumstances, there is no question that the trial court properly 
declined to apply the Bair standard to the facts of this case. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in Bair that: 
[Municipal] governing bodies, in the exercise of governmental or legislative 
power cannot make a contract which is binding on the municipality after the 
end of such governing body's term of office. But in the exercise of its 
business or proprietary power such body may bind the municipality for as 
long a period of time as is reasonably necessary to accomplish a legal 
purpose. 
Id. at 902. Under this principle, governmental entities may not bind their successors to 
contracts that involve the performance of a governmental function or power, whereas they 
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may bind their successors to contracts pertaining to the entity's performance of a 
proprietary or business function.4 
Beyond its statement that "contracts involving water, electricity, and gas supply 
and sewer systems . . . are generally held to be an exercise of the business or proprietary 
power," id., the Bair Court did not offer any guidance about how to distinguish between 
governmental and proprietary functions. In light of the widespread criticism leveled 
against the distinction, the Bair Court's failure to do so is telling. Numerous courts have 
berated the distinction in no uncertain terms. See, e.g., Indian Towing Co. v. United 
States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955) (labeling distinction as a "quagmire that has long plagued 
the law of municipal corporations"); Denver v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 754 P.2d 
1172, 1174 (Colo. 1988) (characterizing distinction as "unhelpful, inherently unsound, 
and 'probably one of the most unsatisfactory known to the law'" (citation omitted)); 
Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Portland, 111 P.2d 119, 123 (Or. 1985) (describing 
distinction as "unworkable, untenable and unhelpful"); Pacific Tel. & Tel Co. v. 
Redevelopment Agency of City ofRedlands, 142 Cal. Rptr. 584, 591 (1977) (indicating 
that the governmental and proprietary labels are of dubious utility). 
Moreover, as Dr. Hardy acknowledges in his brief, many courts have abandoned 
the distinction for purposes of determining whether an agreement entered into by a 
4
 Only one Utah case subsequent to Bair appears to have applied the Bair 
principle to a government contract. In Salt Lake City v. State of Utah, 448 P.2d 350, 353 
(Utah 1968), the Utah Supreme Court held that Salt Lake City could not repudiate a water 
contract because selling water was a proprietary activity. 
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governmental entity may bind its successors in office. For example, in a case with 
striking similarities to this one, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that a professional 
services agreement is voidable by a governing body when the contract does not bestow a 
"definable advantage " upon the public entity. See Mariano & Associates, P.C. v. Board 
of County Commissioners, 131 P.2d 323, 331-32 (Wyo. 1987). In Mariano, the county 
commissioners entered into a two-year service contract with an accounting firm. After 
one year, a member of the accounting firm left the firm and approached the county about 
securing the contract at a more economical rate. The county then terminated the two-year 
agreement with the firm and entered into a one-year contract with the accountant who had 
departed from the firm. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the termination of the two-year contract by 
the county, recognizing that "a board, officer or governing body should not contract away 
the discretion of future decision makers or more importantly the fiscal welfare of the 
citizens that they were elected or appointed to serve.11 Id. at 329. Based upon the 
principle that a governing body should not be allowed to tie the hands of future decision 
makers, the Mariano court held that "an agreement extending beyond the term of the 
contracting authority . . . may be voidable by the government or void upon attack by a 
third party if, under the circumstances, the agreement is not reasonably necessary or of a 
definable advantage to the city or governmental body." Id. at 331-32. 
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Wyoming courts have consistently adhered to the standard established in Mariano. 
See, e.g., Michie v. Board of Trustees of Carbon County Sch. Dist. No. / , 847 P.2d 1006, 
1010 (Wyo. 1993) (holding that board of trustees of school properly voided prior board's 
agreement to maintain group health plan); Kautza v. City of Cody, 812 P.2d 143, 145 
(Wyo. 1991) (noting that Mariano adopted standard inquiring into whether agreement 
was reasonably necessary or of definable advantage to governmental entity); Keabler v. 
City ofRiverton, 808 P.2d 205, 206-07 (Wyo. 1991) (concluding that insurance benefits 
described in municipal employee manual were voidable by city council following current 
council's term). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also followed Mariano in a case 
requiring the application of Wyoming law. See Figuly v. City of Douglas, 76 F.3d 1137, 
1142 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that a personal services agreement with city was voidable 
at the term of the contracting authority unless it was of "definable advantage" to the city); 
Tri County Landfill Assoc, Inc. v. Brule County, 619 N.W.2d 663, 673-74 (S.D. 2000) 
(quoting Figuly for proposition that prior decisions of predecessor boards do not bind the 
hands of current board, without referring to governmental-proprietary distinction). As 
discussed more fully below, under the Mariano rule, the UBMC Board was clearly within 
its rights in terminating the Agreement with Dr. Hardy. 
The State of Illinois also recently abandoned the governmental-proprietary 
distinction in addressing the validity of a governmental contract. In Cannizzo v. Berwyn 
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Township 708 Community Mental Health Board, _ N.E. _ , 2000 WL 1875876,5 a 
former executive director of an Illinois township mental health board filed an action for 
breach of contract against the mental health board, which had terminated the plaintiffs 
employment agreements on the basis of insubordination. Applying what it termed the 
"majority rule," the court went even further than Mariano, concluding that the 
employment agreements were void ab initio because they extended beyond the term of 
the townshipfs supervisor. See id. at *6. The Court explained that "it is contrary to the 
effective administration of a political subdivision to allow elected officials to tie the 
hands of their successors with respect to the decisions regarding the welfare of the 
subdivision." Id. at *4. The application of the Cannizzo standard to the facts at issue in 
this case also confirms the trial court's ruling permitting UBMCs Board to terminate the 
Agreement. 
Although the State of Utah has not expressly overruled Bair's governmental-
proprietary analysis in the context of governmental contracts such as the one at issue in 
this case, numerous Utah cases have addressed the distinction in the context of 
governmental immunity from tort liability. In doing so, these courts have resoundingly 
concluded that the distinction is useless and should no longer be relied upon for purposes 
of determining whether a governmental entity is immune from suit. See Standiford v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1233 (Utah 1980) (abolishing governmental-proprietary 
5
 A copy of this soon-to-be published case is attached hereto as Addendum E. 
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distinction for purposes of governmental immunity analysis, narrowing standard to 
whether activity "is of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a 
governmental agency or . . . it is essential to the core of governmental activity," and 
holding that operation of public golf course was not a governmental function). As a 
consequence, "[i]n this state, the governmental-proprietary test, which gave rise to highly 
confused legal analysis and inconsistent results, is no longer determinative of whether a 
governmental entity is entitled to governmental immunity." Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616, 
627 (Utah 2000). 
In 1987, the Utah Legislature took Standifords abandonment of the governmental-
proprietary distinction even further, by broadening the definition of "governmental 
function" to encompass "a//governmental acts" for purposes of governmental immunity. 
See Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 433 (Utah 1995) (holding that claims against Salt Lake 
County building inspectors were barred by Governmental Immunity Act and that 
immunity provided thereunder did not violate the open courts clause of the Utah 
Constitution). According to the relevant statute, 
"Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, operation, function, 
or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the act, failure to 
act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as governmental, 
proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to government, 
undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a government 
or governmental functions, or could be performed by private enterprise or 
private persons. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a) (emphasis added). The actions of the Utah Supreme 
Court and the Legislature demonstrate that the trial court's refusal to follow the 
governmental-proprietary distinction was proper and that its decision should be affirmed. 
In Park City Education Association v. Board of Education, 879 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994), the Utah Court of Appeals rejected the Park City Board of Education's 
argument that its contract with a teachers' association was void because it was "an 
improper delegation of legislative authority." Id. at 274. The Court of Appeals further 
distinguished this contract with contracts that would be voidable, such as contracts in 
which the board relinquishes "to a private entity the ability to make decisions" and 
contracts which "bind itself and future boards indefinitely to a particular policy." Id. 
(emphasis added). This statement demonstrates the Utah Court of Appeals1 
acknowledgment of the rule that a public entity cannot bind itself and future boards 
indefinitely to a long-term contract such as the Agreement. 
As Dr. Hardy readily acknowledges in his brief, the governmental-proprietary 
distinction is cumbersome and should not serve as a guide to whether governmental 
entities may bind successor boards. Further, contrary 1o Dr. Hardy's suggestion, see 
Appellant's Br. at 14 n.3, the distinction performs equally poorly in all contexts. See City 
of Beaufort v. Beaufort-Jasper County Water & Sewer Auth., 480 S.E.2d 728, 731 (S.C. 
1997) ("There is no basis for finding an action is governmental for purposes of tort 
liability and proprietary for purposes of contractual liability. Rather, the distinction 
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between governmental and proprietary functions should rest on the nature of the 
government act at issue rather than on the nature of a subsequent lawsuit."); Morningstar 
Water Users Assoc, Inc. v. Farmington Mun. Sch. Dist., 901 P.2d 725, 730-31 (N.M. 
1995) ("We contend that the same illogic that made the [governmental-proprietary] 
dichotomy inappropriate for sovereign immunity analysis, makes it inappropriate for any 
legal analysis in New Mexico."); City of Colorado Springs v. Timberlane Assoc., 824 
P.2d 776 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that governmental-proprietary distinction "is not 
a viable means by which to determine the running of limitations."). In fact, this Court has 
criticized the distinction in a case analyzing whether the state held funds from a mortgage 
foreclosure sale in its proprietary or governmental capacity, describing it as a "distinction 
without a difference." Duchesne County v. State Tax Comm'n, 140 P.2d 335, 338 (Utah 
1943). Use of the standard in one context but not in others would do nothing to rectify 
the inconsistency resulting from application of the standard that has permeated the law of 
state and local government for decades. 
Finally, according to Dr. Hardy, the trial court erred in its determination that the 
Agreement was voidable because, rather than assessing whether the Agreement involved 
a governmental or proprietary function, the court focused on whether or not UBMC was a 
governmental entity. See Appellant's Br. at 12, n.l. This characterization of the trial 
court's ruling is inaccurate and gives far too little credence to the trial court's analysis. 
Indeed, the trial court was clearly aware that whether UBMC was a governmental entity 
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was a threshold question regarding application of the rule in the first instance. The court 
was also cognizant of the governmental-proprietary distinction and it was aware that the 
test inquired into the function being performed by the governmental entity, as opposed to 
whether the entity itself qualified as governmental. Towards the end of the hearing on 
Dr. Hardy's and UBMCs cross-motions for summary judgment, in fact, the court 
specifically referred to the issue of whether a governmental entity "is acting [in its] 
proprietary capacity or its governmental capacity," which inquiry it described as f,[t]he 
old concept when dealing in municipal corporations." R. at 1100, p. 64. 
Under the circumstances described above, the trial court's refusal to apply the 
standard articulated in Bair was proper and should be affirmed by this Court. 
B. Even if the Court Were to Retain the Bair Standard, the Agreement Is 
Voidable Because it Impermissibly Binds Successor Boards in the 
Performance of a Governmental Function and Because it Is Perpetual. 
Dr. Hardy also contends that, in entering into the Agreement, UBMCs Board was 
performing a proprietary function, rendering the Agreement enforceable under Bair. This 
argument is incorrect under Utah cases analyzing governmental immunity and under the 
principles established in other jurisdictions for determining what governmental functions 
qualify as governmental or proprietary. 
First, Dr. Hardy's application of the governmental-proprietary distinction is 
incorrect. While Dr. Hardy has strenuously argued that his activities under the 
Agreement are proprietary because they do not involve policymaking, the focus of the test 
#98247 v2 22 
is not on whether the subject of the contract or the duties imposed on the non-
governmental contracting party are governmental or proprietary. Instead, the test inquires 
whether the board, in entering into the contract, is performing a governmental function. 
Second, although the Utah case law on this subject is difficult to decipher, in large 
part because of the application of the basically unsound proprietary/governmental 
analysis, see Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1233, a significant number of Utah cases have held 
that the operation of governmentally-owned health care facilities such as UBMC 
constitutes a governmental function. See, e.g., Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 
1980) (holding that "operation of a governmentally-owned health care facility . . . [is] a 
'governmental function1 as contemplated by the [Governmental Immunity Act]"); Madsen 
v. State, 583 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1978) (holding that operation of state prison hospital 
qualified as a governmental function because, among other things, facility was operated 
for the general public good and operation was generally regarded as a public 
responsibility); cf. Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 842 n.9 (Utah 1990) 
(noting that provision of emergency medical care by a governmental entity is a 
governmental function under current Governmental Immunity Act); Birkner v. Salt Lake 
County, 111 P.2d 1053, 1059 (Utah 1989) (concluding that county mental health facility 
was a "governmental health care facility" entitled to immunity); accord 40A Am. Jur. 2d 
Hospitals & Asylums § 51 (1999) (stating that, "in maintaining a public hospital, a county 
necessarily performs a governmental function"). 
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Only two Utah cases have determined that the provision of health care is not a 
governmental function. First, in Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975), a 
case decided prior to Standiford, the Utah Supreme Court held that "the operation of the 
hospital by Payson City is in a proprietary capacity." Id. at 801.6 Second, the Utah 
Supreme Court indicated in Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 
1989), that, although the legislature added governmenlally-owned hospitals to the 
category of governmental entities covered by governmental immunity statute, it did not 
necessarily categorize the operation of a health care facility as a governmental function. 
Id. at 351; see also Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P 2d 838, 843 n.10 (Utah 1990) 
(explaining that legislature's grant of immunity to governmental health care facilities in 
1978 did not necessarily classify provision of health catre services as governmental). In 
light of the other cases decided by this Court and in light of the deterioration of the 
governmental-proprietary standard in this State, however, these cases are anomalous. In 
the Condemarin case, for example, the Court relied heavily on the fact that the state-
owned University Hospital "virtually operates in the private sector, competing with other 
private, nonprofit entities, as well as with for-profit hospitals. In the area of patient 
6
 A subsequent case cited Greenhalgh in dissent for the conclusion that the 
operation of a county hospital constitutes a governmental function. See Edwards v. Iron 
County, 531 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah 1975) (Maughan, J., dissenting). 
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service, it is not in the business of establishing government policy." Id. at 364. By 
contrast, UBMC operates the only hospital in Duchesne County.7 
Not only are the facts of Condemarin distinguishable from this case but also more 
recent cases have clarified that whether a government performs a function that may also 
be performed by a private entity is not determinative of whether the function is 
governmental. See Lyon, 5 P.3d at 627 (rejecting "the proposition that just because an 
activity that is performed by government may be, or sometimes is, performed privately, 
that activity is therefore a nonessential governmental activity and not entitled to 
immunity"); see also Morningstar, 901 P.2d at 730 (explaining that protection of public 
health is often deemed governmental, despite the fact that similar activities are frequently 
performed by private enterprise); Mountain States Tel & Tel, ISA P.2d at 1175 ("In 
addition to being an unreliable means of distinguishing exercises of municipal authority, 
the governmental-proprietary distinction is analytically unsound because it assumes that 
functions which were once relegated to the private sector could not later be undertaken in 
support of the health, safety and welfare of its citizens."). Under this principle, the factors 
relied on by the Greenhalgh Court are no longer of legal significance. See Greenhalgh, 
530 P.2d at 800 (relying, in part, on whether hospital was operated "in competition with 
free enterprise"). "If the proprietary distinction has any significance, one thing it does not 
7
 On July 3, 2000, by resolution of the Duchesne County Commission, 
Duchesne County conveyed the assets of UBMC to a non-profit, 501(c)(3) community 
hospital organization that presently operates the hospital. 
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mean is that a municipality, when engaging in a business like activity, will suddenly make 
a miraculous legal transformation into a private enterprise.1' Morningstar, 901 P.2d at 
733; see also Duchesne County, 140 P.2d at 340 ("If [a county] exists only 
governmentally, it cannot well have any capacity which is not governmental.11 (emphasis 
added)). Like the Lyon Court, which concluded that driving an emergency vehicle to the 
scene of a fire qualifies as a governmental function, this Court should hold that the 
operation of a governmentally-owned hospital also is a governmental function, 
particularly when the county operates the only hospital in the County. 
To qualify as a governmental function under Standiford, an activity must be of 
such a unique nature that it either can be performed by a governmental agency or that it is 
essential to the core of governmental activity." Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1233. Dr. Hardy 
argues that because the UBMC Board does not itself operate the pathology lab, operating 
the hospital is a proprietary function because it need not be performed only by a 
governmental agency. This argument ignores the fact that the Board, which was 
established and is overseen by Duchesne County, operates the hospital generally and has 
the ultimate responsibility and authority with respect to the general functioning of the 
hospital, including the authority to appoint medical staff and contract with healthcare 
professionals for services. Moreover, even though a hospital can be operated by a private 
entity, it is evident that operating a county hospital, the establishment of which is 
authorized by statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 17-26-1, can only be accomplished by a 
county. The UBMC Bylaws confirm that UBMCs operations are inextricably linked to 
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the County and the Board: "The hospital is owned by Duchesne County. The Hospital 
Board is created by the Duchesne County Commission. The Hospital is subject to the 
control and supervision of the Board of the Uintah Basin Medical Center." R. at 993; 
Addendum D to Appellants Br. at 1. Further, the ultimate responsibility for appointing 
the medical staff, entering into the Agreement, and terminating the Agreement lay with 
the Board. UBMC's Bylaws state that the Board shall be responsible for "[ajppointing 
and reappointment of the hospital's medical staff and allied health professionals and 
taking final action with respect to clinical privileges and corrective action," "[a]pproval of 
the personnel policies and annual wage and salary administration program," and 
"[establishing an appeal mechanism and acting as final appeal body for grievances and 
issues related to medical staff privileges." See R. at 994-5; Addendum D to Appellant's 
Br. at 2-3. Thus, the Board's relationship to Dr. Hardy as established under the 
Agreement constitutes a governmental function even under Dr. Hardy's description of the 
test. 
Further, the operation of a county hospital falls within the realm of providing for 
the health and safety of the county's citizens, which itself is a traditional manifestation of 
the police power falling squarely within the "core of governmental activity." Perhaps 
more importantly, it is critical that Duchesne County not be impeded of the discretion 
required to deliver adequate health care services in general and pathology services in 
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particular to its citizens since it has undertaken this responsibility. Enforcing the 
Agreement, which has the potential to continue at least during Dr. Hardy's lifetime, would 
certainly impede this critical aspect of operating UBMC. 
In fact, in recognition of the critical public function served by governmentally-
owned hospitals and health care facilities, the Governmental Immunity Act expressly 
includes the operation of such entities within its coverage. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
3(1) (stating that "all governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which 
arises from the exercise of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, 
nursing home, or other governmental health care facility"). If the operation of such 
facilities is deemed of sufficient importance to cloak their activities with immunity, then 
surely the hands of the policymakers operating the entities should not be tied to long term 
agreements such as the one at issue in this case. 
Finally, even if UBMC's entry into the Agreement was an exercise of a proprietary 
function, the question remains, under Bair, whether the Agreement bound UBMC longer 
than necessary to accomplish its purposes. See Bair, 307 P.2d at 895; see also Rhode 
Island Student Loan Auth. v. NELS, Inc., 550 A.2d 624, 627 (R.I. 1988) (stating that even 
when contract is found to be proprietary, court must still determine whether it binds 
successor board "for a period of time longer than necessary to accomplish its purposes" 
(citing Bair)). The answer to this question is a resounding "yes." The potentially 
perpetual duration of Dr. Hardy's contract with UBMC was limited only by the "just 
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cause" provision, which might never have permitted UBMC to terminate the Agreement. 
In light of UBMC's purpose of providing high-quality health care services to the citizens 
of Duchesne County, there is no question that the Agreement was longer than necessary 
to serve this purpose. In Bair, the court determined that the contract was fair and 
reasonable when it was made because "a long term contract was necessary in order for the 
city to obtain adequate sewage treatment and disposal facilities with the least possible 
delay and expense, and to have such facilities constructed in accordance with a long term 
plan to take care of the city's needs for an unlimited period of time.11 Bair, 307 P.2d at 
903. In this case, on the other hand, the Agreement with Dr. Hardy did just the 
opposite—it bound Duchesne County indefinitely to services which became inadequate 
for its needs. Because the Agreement did not allow UBMC to respond to the changing 
needs of the community, the potentially perpetual term was clearly unreasonable when 
the parties entered into the Agreement. Under these circumstances, the Agreement was 
voidable even if it is deemed to be proprietary. 
Indeed, given the increased needs of the Duchesne County citizenry for pathology 
services and UBMC's need for increased physician staffing in its emergency department, 
the term of the Agreement was far too long to serve this purpose adequately. Public 
hospitals are obliged to provide adequate medical care to the public and, in order to do so, 
they must adapt to the changing needs of the public they serve. See Bloom v. Clara 
Maass Medical Center, 685 A.2d 966, 972 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); accord 
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Belmar v. Cipolla, 475 A.2d 533, 538 (N.J. 1983) ("As long as those entrusted with the 
management and governance of a hospital make reasonable decisions consistent with the 
public interest, their decisions should be respected.ff). The need for deference is 
especially great with respect to decisions involving professional staff members: "A 
hospital's selection of medical staff is thus deeply embedded in public policy concerns 
and must be 'exercised reasonably and for the public good/" Bloom, 685 A.2d at 972 
(citation omitted); Belmar, 475 A.2d at 538 (hospitals must always be mindful of 
paramount duty to the public, particularly when making decisions relating to staff 
members). Moreover, hospitals owned and operated by governmental entities have an 
even more heightened duty toward the public, because governmental entities such as 
counties and municipalities also are bound to provide for the health and welfare of the 
public. MA municipality never—in any capacity, at any time—ceases to be a government 
entity; nor does it ever forego the rights and responsibilities of a government entity.ff 
Morningstar, 901 P.2d at 733. 
UBMC respectfully asks the Court to affirm the trial court's ruling because the 
operation of a governmental health care facility constitutes a governmental function or, 
alternatively, because the Agreement bound UBMC longer than necessary to accomplish 
its purpose. 
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II. Regardless of What Standard the Court Adopts in Place of Bair, the 
Agreement Was Voidable by Successor Boards of UBMC, 
As discussed above, courts have developed a variety of tests for assessing whether 
particular governmental contracts may be voided by successor boards. For example, Dr. 
Hardy advocates the adoption of a test that inquires into whether agreements bind 
successor boards1 necessary discretion in the performance of their policymaking roles. 
See Appellants Br. at 26. Other factors analyzed by courts include whether the successor 
board's discretion is unnecessarily hampered with respect to decisions regarding the 
public welfare, see Cannizzo, 2000 WL 1875876, at *4, whether the agreement is 
reasonably necessary or of a definable advantage to the public or the governmental entity, 
see Mariano, 731 P.2d at 331-32, and whether the extended term of the agreement was 
justified when the agreement was made. See id. at 329. Regardless of which factor or 
standard this Court deems to be determinative, UBMCfs termination of the Agreement 
was lawful and the trial court's decision to that effect should be affirmed. 
With respect to whether the Agreement in this case bound the hands of successor 
boards of UBMC with respect to their policymaking function, UBMC's duty to serve the 
evolving health care needs of Duchesne County was indisputably hampered by the 
Agreement. Without the option of terminating the Agreement, the Board would have had 
no means of fulfilling this duty. Additionally, Dr. Hardy's argument regarding whether 
the Board's policymaking function is impaired focuses on the wrong issue. Although Dr. 
Hardy claims that he only suggested policies regarding the pathology lab to UBMC, it is 
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not Dr. Hardy's conduct that is in issue. Rather, it is the Board's ability to establish policy 
that must be examined. As the only hospital in Duchesne County, UBMC clearly had a 
duty to ensure that the health care services it undertook to provide were adequate to meet 
the county's needs. This function was substantially hampered by the Agreement. Dr. 
Hardy's claim that the "just cause" provision prevented any hindrance to the Board's 
policymaking role is also unfounded. Without some lapse in Dr. Hardy's performance, 
the Board might never have been able to terminate the Agreement, which surely 
represents an interference with its discretion to establish health care policy for the county. 
The Agreement also was not reasonably necessary to UBMC nor did it offer 
UBMC a "definable advantage." UBMC's Board, in an exercise of its discretion, 
terminated the Agreement because believed it was in the best interests of the hospital and 
county to contract with a full time, on-site pathologist who could also provide service in 
the emergency department. In light of UBMC's duty to serve the medical needs of the 
public, UBMC found itself in a position of reassessing the utility of the Agreement, 
ultimately determining that the needs of the public would be better served by full-time, 
on-site pathology services. Accepting Dr. Hardy's argument would effectively bind 
UBMC's current and future boards to a contract that is no longer beneficial to the hospital 
or county. Such a result is contrary to public policy and is certainly of no definable 
advantage to UBMC. 
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Finally, contrary to Dr. Hardy's suggestion that the length of the Agreement was 
necessary to lure medical professionals to Duchesne County, there was no reason, at the 
time the parties entered into the Agreement, to bind the Boardfs successors to a potentially 
perpetual contract. Instead, the need for UBMC to remain flexible in addressing the 
county's health care needs superseded any need for a perpetual agreement. If anything, 
Dr. Hardy's reference to the problems facing rural communities in obtaining health care 
underscores the need for flexibility, rather than for lifetime contracts. Because the needs 
of the community served by UBMC were likely to evolve, the potentially perpetual term 
was unreasonable when the parties entered into the Agreement. 
In advocating a replacement for the Bair standard, Dr. Hardy urges the Court to 
focus on what he himself describes as f,the very compelling policy reasons for prohibiting 
municipalities from binding their successors to contracts." Appellant's Br. at 25-26. 
As the Wyoming Supreme Court explained, the public policy underlying the rule "is 
straightforward: A governing body should not be able to deprive its successor in interest 
of discretion to act for the public good." Michie, 847 P.2d at 1010. Like the trial court, 
this Court should conclude that the Agreement impermissibly interfered with the Board's 
discretion to operate UBMC in the best interests of the public. 
III. Dr. Hardy's Arguments Regarding The Application of General Rule to the 
UBMC Board Are Misplaced. 
Dr. Hardy argues that the general rule restricting governmental entities from 
entering into contracts that extend beyond their terms does not apply to the facts of this 
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case for three reasons relating to the nature of the UBMC Board: (1) An appointed board, 
like UBMC's, does not merit the benefits of the rule; (2) the general rule does not apply 
to staggered boards; and (3) a governmental board cannot void a contract unless a 
majority of its members have been replaced. Each of these arguments misses the point of 
the general rule and does not preclude the rule's enforcement in this case. 
A* The General Rule Applies as Forcefully to Appointed Officials as It Does to 
Elected Officials. 
Dr. Hardy makes the astounding argument that the general rule restricting 
governmental bodies from contracting beyond the officers1 term does not apply to an 
appointed board simply because it was not elected. Recognizing that the general rule 
exists to allow public officials to address the public's changing needs, what Dr. Hardyfs 
argument really implies becomes apparent: appointed government officials owe lesser 
duties to protect and serve the public than elected officials. This, of course, is 
nonsensical. 
As a factual matter, Dr. Hardy's description of the board as consisting of appointed 
officials is not completely accurate. One member of the Board is an elected county 
commissioner and seven other members are appointed to the Board by elected officials. 
See R. at 1038, 1044-45. Thus, Dr. Hardy's attempt to paint the Board as merely 
appointed officials without any direct connection to the electorate is in error. 
Dr. Hardy points to no thoughtful justification for this distinction between elected 
and appointed officials, except that the distinction apparently exists in some cases, and 
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that perhaps an appointed official is "not duty-bound" to uphold the policies of the elected 
officials. See Appellants Br. at 30. All of the democratic policies in favor of restricting 
municipal governments from binding their successors, however, apply equally to 
appointed and elected government officials. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
noted, the general rule allows both appointed and elected officials the freedom to carry 
out their public responsibilities unhindered: 
The obvious purpose of the rule is to permit a newly appointed 
governmental body to function freely on behalf of the public and in 
response to the governmental power or body politic by which it was 
appointed or elected, unhampered by the policies of the predecessors who 
have since been replaced by the appointing or electing power. 
Lobolito, Inc. v. North Pocono School Dist, 755 A.2d 1287, 1289-1290 (Pa. 2000) 
(emphasis added). Simply put, the general rule applies with no less force to appointed 
officials. 
Furthermore, imposing Dr. Hardy's appointed/elected distinction would have the 
dubious and incongruous result of expanding the power of appointed board members 
beyond the elected officials who appointed them in the first place. Whereas under Dr. 
Hardy's distinction an elected board could not enter into a contract that endured longer 
than the officials' terms, an appointed board would have no such limitation and could, as 
Dr. Hardy demands, bind its successors in perpetuity, even if the contract were to cause 
"loss to the public." See Mitchell v. Chester Housing Auth., 132 A.2d 873, 879 (Pa. 1957) 
(explaining inappropriateness of allowing municipal board to tie the hands of incoming 
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board, particularly when it causes loss to the public). The Court of Appeals in Illinois 
recognized this possibility and rejected the distinction Dr. Hardy proposes. See Cannizzo, 
2000 WL 1875876, at *7 ("We refuse to expand the contracting power of an appointed 
community mental health board beyond the powers of the township supervisor and board 
of trustees that appointed such board."). 
Dr. Hardy points to several cases which he claims support his novel theory 
distinguishing between appointed and elected boards. None of those cases, however, 
actually relies on this purported distinction in arriving at a result.8 Moreover, courts have 
repeatedly applied the general rule to appointed officials. See Rhode Island Student Loan 
Auth., 550 A.2d at 25 (board appointed by state governor); Cannizzo, 2000 WL 1875876, 
at *3-4 (local community mental health board appointed by elected township 
supervisors); Mitchell, 132 A.2d at 874 (local housing authority board appointed by 
governor). 
This Court should not be the first to apply the contrived distinction Dr. Hardy 
urges. Differentiating between appointed and elected officials will invite incoherence 
8
 See, e.g., Board of Klamath County Comm 'rs v. Select County Employees, 
939 P.2d 80 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (no determinative analysis regarding whether officials 
were elected or appointed); Airport Impact Relief Inc. v. Mass. Port Auth., 1995 WL 
809553 (Mass. 1995) (rejecting claim that agreement unenforceable because it binds 
successor officials who have staggered terms, with no analysis on whether appointed 
officials owe distinct duties from elected officials); City of Hazel Park v: Potter, 426 
N.W.2d 789 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (no determinative analysis regarding whether officials 
were elected or appointed); Tryon v. Avra Valley Fire Dist., 659 F. Supp. 283 (D. Ariz. 
1986) (same); Labor Relations Comm 'n v. Board of Selectmen ofDracut, 373 N.E.2d 
1165 (Mass. 1978) (same). 
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into the law governing local governments, while having the unintended effect of 
expanding the power of appointed officials beyond that of elected officials. 
B. The General Rule Applies With Equal Force to Boards Whose Members 
Serve Staggered Terms. 
Recognizing the general rule that governmental boards may not bind their 
successors, Dr. Hardy argues that a "staggered terml, exception to the rule should apply 
here. Dr. Hardy's argument is based upon faulty logic and an erroneous understanding of 
how counties and municipalities operate and, as a result, it should be rejected. 
In the first place, a staggered term exception to the general rule is not widely 
recognized and has been strongly criticized. See Piedmont Pub. Serv. Dist. v. Cowart, 
459 S.E.2d 876, 882 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995), affd, 478 S.E.2d 836 (S.C. 1996). In 
Piedmont, the court explained that the "public policy concerns underlying the rule that a 
municipal corporation cannot bind successor boards are equally applicable in cases where 
the members of the board have staggered terms." Id. at 882. Ensuring that governing 
bodies remain free to enact policy changes and to respond to the evolving needs of the 
public is a concern that applies to all such bodies, not just to those whose members' terms 
expire at the same time. See id. In affirming the Piedmont decision, the Supreme Court 
of South Carolina stated that "[w]e agree with the Court of Appeals that the policy 
considerations [underlying the general rule] are not changed by the bestowal of perpetual 
succession." Piedmont Pub. Serv. Dist. v. Cowart, 478 S.E.2d 836, 838 (S.C. 1996). 
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The Piedmont court is not alone in its evaluation of the claimed exception. In In re 
Board of Klamath County Commissioners, 939 P.2d 80 (Or. Ct. App. 1997), the court 
refused to allow a previous board to bind its successors to an employment agreement 
which "prevented the incoming Board... from terminating [an employee] except for 
death, disability or cause." Id. at 81, 83. Even though the terms of the board members in 
Klamath were staggered, the court held that the board was essentially one of "finite 
tenure" because two of the three members of the board stood for election at the same 
time. Id. at 84; see also Black v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 830 P.2d 1103, 1110 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting argument that because members of a governing board 
had staggered terms, their contracts could not be deemed to bind their successors in 
office), off'd sub nom. La Plata Med. Center Assoc, Ltd. v. United Bank of Durango, 857 
P.2d 410 (Colo. 1993); Rogers v. City of South Charleston, 256 S.E. 2d 557, 562 (W. Va. 
1979) (voiding contract that extends beyond term of staggered term board); Parent v. 
Woonsocket Rous. Auth., 143 A.2d 146, 148 (R.I. 1958) (same). 
Further, Dr. Hardy has offered no countervailing policy justification for applying 
the general rule to boards without staggered terms but not to boards with staggered terms. 
Instead, he merely recites result-oriented decisions that have described staggered term 
boards as "continuous" in nature and argues that there is never any future board to be 
impermissibly bound. As a matter of logic, this argument is surely mistaken since a 
boardfs membership will necessarily change over time. 
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Some of the cases Dr. Hardy cites in support of his staggered board exception 
specifically refer to the "corporate" nature of the body, erroneously suggesting that 
municipalities should be like private corporations, which are legally perpetual by nature 
See, e.g., Manley v. Scott, 121 N.W. 628, 629 (Minn. 1909) ("[T]he board of county 
commissioners is a corporation . . . It is a continuing body . . . [T]he corporation 
continues unchanged.") (emphasis added); St. Louis Police Officers' Assoc, v. Board of 
Police Comm 'rs9 846 S.W.2d 732, 739 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (ff[T]he corporation 
continues unchanged." (emphasis added)). Comparing municipalities to private 
corporations, however, is misguided because doing so ignores public officers' obligations 
to the general public whom they serve and the democratic principles that pertain to 
government. See Morningstar, 901 P.2d at 733-34 ("A municipality never—in any 
capacity, at any time—ceases to be a government entity; nor does it forego the rights and 
responsibilities of a government entity... A municipality is not a commercial institution. 
It is an auxiliary of the state government. "); see also Janice C. Griffith, Local 
Government Contracts: Escaping from the Govermental/Proprietary Maze, 75 IOWA L. 
REV. 277, 317 (1990) (stating that governmental boards are "public in nature and are 
created to perform functions different from those undertaken by individuals or enterprises 
engaged in business activities"). Dr. Hardy's proposed exception undermines the function 
of the general rule, is poorly reasoned, and is rooted in an erroneous conception of county 
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and municipal government. This Court should avoid the quagmire that would result from 
applying the claimed exception here.9 
C. The General Rule Applies Regardless of Whether a Majority of the Board 
Has Been Replaced When the Contract is Voided. 
Along the same lines as his staggered board argument, Dr. Hardy argues that the 
general rule against binding successor governmental entities should only apply when a 
majority of officers have been replaced. This proposal is unsound for several reasons 
and, even if applied, would not change the result in this case. 
First, Dr. Hardy's argument assumes that the general rule against binding 
successor boards only applies retrospectively, i.e., at the time officers are replaced and a 
new board is constituted. There is no basis for applying the rule in such a way. The 
rule's effect in precluding a municipal board from undertaking action that would bind its 
successors operates not only when a successor board seeks to terminate an agreement, but 
also the rule may and should operate to prevent incumbent boards from entering into 
long-term contracts in the first instance. See Mitchell, 132 A.2d at 879 (predecessor's 
appointment limited to term of predecessor); Rawlins v. Levy Court of Kent County, 235 
A.2d 840, 841 (Del. 1967) (term of appointment expires with expiration of the term of 
9
 Applying Dr. Hardy's staggered board exception would have far-reaching 
effects throughout Utah state government. State law mandates staggered terms for nearly 
all forms and levels of state and municipal government entities. See, e.g., Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-3-201, etseq. (mayors and city council members); Id. § 17-52-102, etseq. 
(county government officials); Id. § 4-2-7 (Agricultural Advisory Board); Id. § 4-3-15 
(Dairy Advisory Board); Id. § 7-3-40 (Board of Bank Advisors). 
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appointing body). Thus, restricting application of the general rule to the time when a new 
majority board is appointed does not square with the rule itself—the board's contracts 
should be limited in duration to the officers' terms as of the time the contracts are 
executed, no matter when a "new board" is constituted. 
Second, the cases Dr. Hardy cites in support of his argument do not hold that the 
general rule only applies when a majority of officers are appointed, but instead they rely 
on other factors for their results.10 UBMC has not located any cases in which a court 
refused to apply the general rule because a majority of the new members had not been 
replaced and courts have repeatedly applied the general rule where less than a majority 
had been replaced. See, e.g., Figuly v. City of Douglas, 853 F. Supp. 381, 383 (D. Wyo. 
1994) (only one member of city council replaced), affd, 76 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1996); 
Mitchell, 132 A.2d 873 (two of five members replaced). In Mariano, the court applied 
the rule despite the fact that only one commissioner had stood for reelection, and was 
reelected, when the agreement in that case was voided. See Mariano, 737 P.2d at 331 
(eliminating the "fiction of term of office and simply determining] that the principle is 
available for contention if the contract performance continues beyond the normal term of 
some membership of the deciding body"). 
10
 See Board of Klamath County Comm'rs, 939 P.2d 80 (no analysis regarding 




In an attempt to bolster his novel proposition that the general rule should only 
apply when a new majority is appointed, Dr. Hardy claims that no one would contract 
with municipalities without his proposed rule. Even if there were evidence that his 
concern was based in fact, which Dr. Hardy has not supplied, Dr. Hardy's worries are not 
alleviated by imposing a "majority board" rule. A board's majority might change as often 
as its individual membership changes, due circumstances such as one-year terms, mid-
term appointments, death, disability or resignation. With or without Dr. Hardy's 
"majority" rule, the general rule may well end up dissuading risk-adverse individuals 
from contracting with governmental entities. While in some cases that may prove to be a 
burden for municipal governments, it is their cross to bear in light of the demands and 
responsibilities that go along with a functioning and responsive democratic government. 
Moreover, as stated above, those who choose to do business with municipalities are 
deemed to have evaluated the risk that successor boards may find their contracts no 
longer meet the public's needs, and to have adjusted their conduct accordingly. See Park 
City Educ. Ass'n., 879 P.2d at 269; accord Cannizzo, 2000 WL 1875876, at *7. 
Finally, as applied to the facts of this case, Dr. Hardy's "majority board" rule is of 
little impact. As explained earlier, by January 1997, approximately two months after 
performance of the Agreement ended, there were five members—three appointed, one 
new ex officio county commissioner and one ex officio chief of the medical staff—who 
were different from the members sitting when the Agreement was executed in December 
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1994. See R. at 1038, 1044-45. Thus, for all intents and purposes, a new board existed 
within two months after performance under the Agreement ended, and, if it applies at all, 
Dr. Hardy's "majority board" exception only applies to a two month period in 1996. 
IV. Neither of Dr. Hardy*s Arguments Relating to the Nature of the Agreement 
Precludes Application of the General Rule in this Case. 
Dr. Hardy also seeks to avoid the application of the general rule by claiming that it 
does not apply to employment contracts and that the Agreement's "just cause" provision 
prevents it from binding successor boards. Dr. Hardy's arguments are without merit. 
A. The Agreement Is Not a Simple Employment Contract, but a Professional 
Services Contract Which Improperly Binds Successors Boards of Trustees. 
Dr. Hardy argues that the Agreement was a simple employment contract, and as 
such was enforceable despite its perpetual nature. According to Dr. Hardy, an 
employment agreement qualifies as a government function only if "the nature of [the] 
office is such that it requires a municipal board or officer to exercise supervisory control 
over the appointee or employee, together with the power of removal." Appellant's Br. at 
32. Dr. Hardy goes on to argue that the contract will be voidable only if the employee is 
working directly for the board and helping the board implement policy. Id. 
Dr. Hardy's argument in this regard reverts directly back to the governmental-
proprietary distinction, which, as explained earlier and as acknowledged by Dr. Hardy, 
has been abandoned under Utah governmental immunity law and is equally unhelpful in 
the context of governmental contracts. Moreover, Dr. Hardy's characterization regarding 
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the nature of the Agreement is misplaced. Under the Agreement, Dr. Hardy supplied 
professional pathology and laboratory services to UBMC on a part-time, mostly off-site 
basis, with only approximately eight hours per month on-site. He also served as a 
member of the hospital's medical staff. The professional services Dr. Hardy contracted to 
provide directly affected the health care needs of the public, an obligation which 
Duchesne County undertook to serve by operating the only hospital in the rural county. 
In addition, as discussed at length above in Section LB, entering into the Agreement 
qualifies as a government function even under the outdated and impractical 
governmental-proprietary test.11 
Furthermore, there is no universal exception that restricts application of the general 
rule only to employees or, as in this case, independent contractors. Indeed, courts 
applying the general rule precluding municipal bodies from binding their successors have 
historically allowed boards to terminate employees who were not necessarily strictly 
dedicated to helping the board determine or implement policy. See, e.g., Mariano, 737 
P.2d at 331-32 (applying general rule to accounting-service contract); Miles v. City of 
Baker, 51 P.2d 1047 (Or. 1935) (applying general rule to auditing contract); Smith v. 
Mitchell, 1 So.2d 765 (Miss. 1941) (applying general rule to contract with auditor); 
11
 As discussed above, Dr. Hardy has misapplied the test in any event. The 
test does not ask whether the subject of the contract or the duties imposed on the non-
governmental contracting party are governmental or proprietary. Instead, the focus of the 
test is on whether the board, in entering into the contract, is performing a governmental or 
proprietary function. 
Miller v. School Dist. 470, 744 P.2d 865 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987) (applying general rule to 
board of education's contract with school administrator employee); Keabler, 808 P.2d 
205 (applying general rule to contract for municipal employee contract benefits). 
In sum, there is no employment agreement exception to the general rule forbidding 
government officials from contracting beyond their term of office. The Court should 
reject this argument. 
B. The Just Cause Provision Does Not Cure the Binding Effect of the 
Agreement Nor Does It Preclude Operation of the General Rule. 
Dr. Hardy argues that the general rule against binding successor boards does not 
apply because any successor board could terminate the contract if it simply had "just 
cause." He essentially argues that the just cause provision cures any binding effect the 
Agreement might have on future boards. This argument rests on misguided logic and 
ignores the policy supporting the general rule. 
The first problem with Dr. Hardyfs argument is that it runs directly counter to the 
very purposes served by the rule restricting boards from binding their successors. If 
UBMC or a similar governmental entity is limited to discontinuing a predecessor's 
contract only when it has just cause, i.e., when Dr. Hardy fails to perform his contracted-
for services in the manner contemplated by the contract, then the purpose of precluding 
predecessor boards from binding their successors is thwarted. Here, even if UBMC 
determines that the contracted-for pathology services no longer sufficiently meet the 
public's needs, as long as Dr. Hardy continues to competently offer the services described 
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in the Agreement, there will never be just cause to terminate the Agreement. In reality, 
the just cause provision prevents future UBMC boards from ever being able to terminate 
the Agreement no matter the health care needs of the public, so long as Dr. Hardy 
provides the minimum services provided for in the contract.12 
Second, Dr. Hardy's reference to In reAverback, 541 N.Y.S.2d 655 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1989) as support for his "just cause" argument mischaracterizes the case's holding. 
Interpreting and applying an obscure New York education statute, the court in Averback 
held that a school administrator could be terminated only in accordance with the terms of 
her employment agreement. Id. at 657. In arriving at that holding, the court rejected the 
argument that the agreement impermissibly bound successor school boards, and explained 
that school administrators are statutorily appointed for a probationary period of three 
years. Id.; N.Y. Education Law § 3012 (McKinney 1999). Thus, the fact that the 
employment agreement allowed termination only for cause during the probationary period 
left "wholly unimpaired" the board's right to terminate the employee at the end of the 
three year period. In re Averback, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 657. The deciding factor was that the 
12
 Dr. Hardy argues that if he "became unable to fulfill the needs of the 
community," UBMC could terminate the contract under the just cause provision. 
Appellant's Br. at 36. If Dr. Hardy concedes that the "just cause" provision includes 
UBMCs right to terminate the contract due to changed conditions or the occurrence of 
evolving public needs, then he would have no quarrel with UBMC's decision to terminate 
the contract, since UBMCs decision was based on precisely such a concern. If Dr. Hardy 
actually intends to make this concession, then this lawsuit is meaningless because 
UBMC's decision to terminate the contract would constitute just cause as a matter of law, 
rendering summary judgment in favor of UBMC appropriate. 
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provision requiring termination only for cause did not affect the board's right to terminate 
the employee after three years. Id. In fact, the court specifically held that the provision 
requiring the employee to be fired only for cause did not render the employment 
agreement "durational in character; rather it furnishes certain procedural safeguards to 
petitioner during the statutory three-year period." Id. Unlike the contract in Averback, 
Dr. Hardy's contract contains no three year probationary period, and under his 
interpretation, it should continue forever. Averback is entirely distinguishable from this 
case, and its holding does not support Dr. Hardy's just cause argument. 
In sum, the just cause provision provides no "cure" for Dr. Hardy's perpetual 
contract. Thus, the just cause provision provides no basis for overturning the trial court's 
decision. 
V. Di\ Hardy's Ratification Argument Does Not Apply Here and Ignores the 
Public Policies in Favor of Governmental Flexibility in Serving the Public. 
Dr. Hardy argues that, just as an agent may bind its principal when the principal 
ratifies an otherwise voidable contract, a predecessor "agent" board may bind a successor 
board. Dr. Hardy's ratification argument fails for two reasons. First, the argument was 
not raised before the trial court and, therefore, it cannot be considered on appeal. See 
Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). 
Second, as Dr. Hardy would have it, any time a successor board pays on a 
predecessor's contract, even if for only a limited time until it can evaluate whether the 
contract meets the public's needs, the successor board would be stuck with the contract. 
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By awkwardly bootstrapping agency law concepts to the law governing counties and 
municipalities, Dr. Hardy ignores the very policy principles that restrict governmental 
boards from binding their successors in the first place. Under agency law, a "deliberate 
and valid ratification with full knowledge of all the material facts is binding [on the 
principal] and cannot afterward be revoked or recalled." Zions First Nat 7 Bank v. Clark 
Clinic Corp,, 762 P.2d 1090, 1989 (Utah 1988). In contrast, the rule allowing a county to 
avoid its predecessor's contracts permits it to implement its policies even when the 
decisions flowing therefrom are contrary to those of the prior board. Treating a 
predecessor board as the equivalent of an agent means that the "agent" board will be able 
to do precisely what the general rule forbids—bind its successor. Thus, as a matter of 
law, a municipal "agent" government has no power to bind its principal for longer than its 
own term. 
Under Dr. Hardy's ratification argument, UBMC ratified the Agreement as soon as 
the new board paid Dr. Hardy for the first time in 1996. This argument practically 
requires that boards who choose not to be bound to their predecessors contracts must 
terminate them as the first order of business at the first meeting of the new term. In 
support of this argument, Dr. Hardy refers to language from several cases noting the fact 
that new boards terminated the contracts shortly after taking office. Those cases, 
however, do not rely on when the contract termination took place for their holdings.13 
13
 See Figuly 853 F. Supp. at 386 (holding that because contract was not 
(continued...) 
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Dr. Hardy's ratification argument presents other difficulties. For example, the 
argument drastically limits a board's ability to consider existing contracts in light of the 
public's changing needs in a careful and considerate manner. Dr. Hardy also mistakenly 
presumes that the only contracts a successor board would terminate are those entered into 
by "lame duck boards" at the end of their terms. Municipal boards may determine that 
contracts which at one time were thought to be beneficial no longer meet the public's 
changing needs, as in this case. In this case, when the Board determined in July 1996 that 
Dr. Hardy's contract failed to meet the evolving pathology and overall needs of UBMC's 
patients, the contract was terminated. Under Dr. Hardy's logic, the Board's only 
opportunity to address the hospital's changing pathology needs would have been at their 
first meeting in January 1996, even if the public's increased or evolving needs were not 
fully understood or never materialized until July 1996. 
This Court should reject Dr. Hardy's ratification argument. It was never preserved 
in proceedings before the trial court, and it fails to account for the policy principles 
underlying the general rule against binding successor boards. 
13(... continued) 
reasonably necessary or of definable advantage to the municipality, contract could be 
avoided); In re Board ofKlammath County Comm Vs., 939 P.2d 80 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) 
(holding that because contract involved government functions of municipality, it could be 
avoided); Tryon v. Avra Valley Fire Dist, 659 F. Supp. 283, 286 (D. Ariz. 1986) (holding 
that because the employment contract at issue was done "in performance of the board's 
governmental function," contract was avoidable); Lobolito, 755 A.2d at 1291 (holding 
that contract was a government function while noting in dicta that old board entered into 




As public government bodies, counties and their officers are subject to the 
limitations placed upon them by principles of democracy, and they remain government 
entities no matter the type of activity they engage in and no matter whether their officers 
are appointed, elected, or serve in staggered terms. One such limitation is the general rule 
precluding governmental bodies from binding their successors. Given the policies 
underlying the general rule, applying meaningless descriptions like "governmental" or 
"proprietary" is not helpful in determining whether certain government action should be 
excepted from the general rule. The better framework for making that determination is to 
consider whether the agreement in question is reasonably necessary or of a definable 
advantage to the governmental body. The Board in this case determined that the 
Agreement no longer met the public's needs and appropriately terminated it, as the 
general rule permits. The trial court's decision should be affirmed, 
DATED this /£_ day of February, 2001, 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLC 
JBftnne J. Benard 
Eric G, Maxfield 
Christine T. Greenwood 
Attorneys for Uintah Basin Medical Center 
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Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Leo W. Hardy, MD. ("Dr. Hard/'), and Plaintiff 
Uintah Basin Medical Center ("UBMC"), stipulate to the following facts: 
1. Dr. Hardy is a board certified Pathologist. 
2. UBMC is the business name for Duchesne County Hospital which is owned by 
Duchesne County and operated by its own Board of Trustees. 
3. On November 29, 1994, Dr. Hardy and UBMC entered into a contract ("the 
Agreement") in which Dr. Hardy agreed to provide professional services for UBMC as director of 
the hospital's pathology laboratory and to perform related duties. (A copy of the Agreement is 
attached as Exhibit "A"). The language of the Agreement was taken from a contract between 
UBMC and Dr. Sannella (a pathologist at UBMC that immediately preceded Dr. Hardy). 
Dr. Hardy modified the contract slightly and returned the edited contract to UBMC. The 
Agreement was then typed onto Duchesne County Hospital letterhead and signed by Bradley D. 
LeBaron ("Mr. LeBaron"), who was UBMC's administrator and had authority to enter into 
personal service contracts on UBMC's behalf. 
4. Paragraph 11 of the Agreement provides: 
This agreement shall become effective August I, 1994 and continue to bind 
the parties to the terms hereof until terminated after ninety (90) days 
written notice for just cause of termination by either party or by mutual 
consent of the parties to a shorter notice period. 
5. The UBMC Board of Trustees ("the Board'") is the entity authorized to terminate 
personal services contract. 
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6. On July 18, 1996, the Board voted to terminate the Agreement and to invite 
Dr. Thomas J. Allred ("Dr. Allred") to join UBMC's medical staff as a pathologist and as an 
emergency room physician. 
7. On July 22, 1996, Dr. Hardy encountered Dr.Allred at UBMC. The two 
physicians engaged in a verbal exchange. 
8. On July 26, 1996, Mr. LeBaron telephoned Dr. Hardy to discuss UBMC's decision 
to terminate the Agreement. In a letter dated July 29, 1996, Mr. LeBaron informed Dr. Hardy 
that UBMC was terminating the Agreement. The letter, in its entirety, stzted: 
As a folio wup to our telephone conference of July 26, 1996 and pursuant 
to the terms of our agreement dated November 29, 1994 item #11 which 
allows for a 90-day termination period, I am hereby giving you notice of 
termination of our contract effective October 29, 1996. 
This same section of our contract allows for a shorter length of termination 
by mutual consent. In our phone conversation, you agreed to work out the 
90-day termination period. 
On behalf of our Board, Medical Stafl^  and patients, I offer our sincere 
appreciation for your services to our hospital and patients. 
9. Dr. Hardy continued working for UBMC until October 28, 1996, approximately 
90 days after UBMC notified him it was terminating the Agreement. 
10. Prior to his termination, Dr. Hardy performed his obligations under the Agreement 
satisfactorily and received no complaints from UBMC or its medical staff. After termination of 
the Agreement, on a few occasions, at the request of members of the UBMC medical staf£ and 
with the approval of the UBMC administration, Dr. Hardy performed limited pathology services 
for members of the UBMC medical staff in Dr. Alfred's absence. 
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II. In its Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. Hardy's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, UBMC asserted that Dr. Hardy's conduct during the July 22, 1996 encounter with 
Dr. Alfred constituted additional just cause for its decision to tenninate Dr. Hardy's contract. The 
decision to terminate was made on July 18, 1996. The Notice of Termination was given to 
Dr. Hardy verbally on July 26, 1996 and in writing on July 29, 1996. 
DATED this Q ^ d a y of September, 1999. 
RAY, QUMNEY & NEBEKER 
John P. Harrington * 
Joni J. Jones 
Attorneys for Leo W. Hardy M.D. 
DATED this ?J( day of September, 1999 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
rine J. Benard 
Jenniffer Nelson Byde 




November 29. 1994 
Leo W. Hardy, M.D. 
P.O. Box 795 
Price. U T 84501 
Dear Dr. Hardy: 
We appreciate your response to our request to have a formal agreement in handling our 
Padiology needs. Listed below is the proposal submitted by you. I have reviewed this with 
Joe Hokett and have found that it meets the needs of Uintah Basin Medical Center at this 
time. Our agreement, therefore, includes the following: 
I. Dr. Hardy agrees to personally visit the Uintah Basin Medical Center Laboratory 
weekly or will have another pathologist visit the hospital if he is unavailable. 
x. Visits will not be substituted with technologists. Duration of visit will be for one to 
two hours devoted to the following activities: 
a. CAP proficiency survey reviews, 
b. Review of Uintah Basin Medical Center QC program. 
c . Recommending process to investigate technical and administrative problems 
and advise zdoption of policies and/or procedures for correction. 
d. Develop liaison with all full-lime Medical Staff members to enable full 
understanding of laboratory's role in supporting Medical Staffs mission. Will 
attend Medical Staff meetings quarterly. This meeting Vrill be considered that 
week's laboratory visit. 
3 . Will be available to the Medical Staff for help with interpretation of laboratory 
results. This would be a physician-to-physician consult. 
4 . Will be available for more complex consultations, bone marrow biopsies, or fine 
needle aspiration biopsy of superficial masses (i .e. , breast, thyroid, lymph node). 
Procedures in these categories will be direct patient services and will be billed as 
such. 
5 . Will undertake teaching activities for both Medical Staff and Laboratory St2lf when 
new procedures are to be introduced 
Leo W. Hardy. MJX 
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6. Every opportunity to educate Laboratory Staff in those areas where new 
information or the need for better understanding of the need for clinical consultation 
will be pursued. 
7. Will take responsibility for continued CXIA accreditation, including interim self-
inspection, review of manuals, and all activities QLXA has identified as Laboratory 
Director responsibilities. 
8. Uintah Basin Medical Center is permitted to formally register me with the State of 
Utah znd CAP as Laboratory Director, and inclusion of my name on any and all 
laboratory reports, Chus documenting my medicolegal relationship with tfietfintfili 
Basin Medical Center Laboratory. 
9. Uintah Basin Medical Center will pay a Laboratory Director's fee of $400-00 per 
month. 
10. All surgical pathology and extra-genital cytology is referred to the Laboratory 
Director's practice, additional activities such as Medical Staff committee work will be 
undertaken. These may include Infection Control, Tissue Reviews, Surgical Case 
Review, JBiood Utilization Review, and involvement in hospital-wide Continuing 
Quality Improvement. 
11. This agreement shall become effective August 1, 1994 and continue to bind the parties 
to the tains hereof until terminated after ninety (90) days written notice for just cause 
of termination by either party or by mutual consent of the parties to a shorter notice 
period. 
Your signature below indicates your acceptance of the responsibilities, services and benefits 
listed below. 
Sincerely. 




UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER 
MEDICAL STAFF MEETING 
July 11, 1996 
CALL TO ORDER: Dr. Rex Ripplinger 
MEMBERS PRESENT: Dr. Brilliant, Dr. Wayne Stewart, Dr. Teresa Stewart, Dr. Buxton, Dr. 
Evans, Dr. Mark Mitchell, Dr. Morrill, Dr. Leo Hardy, Brad LeBaron, 
Geri Nielson 
MEMBERS EXCUSED: Dr. Hal Mitchell, gBMaG83SQ, Dr. Karlsson, Callie Pena 
MINUTES: The minutes of June 1996 were approved. 
OLD BUSINESS: Medicare is making strong statements about reimbursement for unnecessary labs. 
Dr. Hardy recommended that physicians be more objective in ordering labs because there is a cost 
incentive in ordering individual tests. Dr. Hardy and Joe Hokett are working together to develop organ 
specific panels and will be working on doctor specific panels as well. Dr. Hardy also indicated that each 
physician would be receiving a copy of a report on blood transfusion risks. If there are any questions, 
he would be happy to discuss them with staff members. 
Dr. Hardy demonstrated new electronic technology which would allow staff members to access the lab 
at Castleview Hospital for current lab results without having to speak directly with the pathologist. Each 
physician would need access to a modem which Dr. Hardy has considered providing for physician 
offices. Dr. Hardy also discussed a Tl line which would allow video conferencing. Several hospitals 
are now using the system and he hopes that our facility would consider investing in the system. This 
would make Dr. Hardy available at any time to report on frozen sections, etc. 
Brad reported that he had met with Ken Richins on a solution to get ER records to referring physicians. 
Ken indicated to Brad that Dr. Pehrson dictates who the referring physician is and Medical Records then 
sends that physician the needed records. This seems to be the best solution to the problem. However, 
Admitting will ask patients reporting to the ER for the name of their physician which will be placed on 
the face sheet. This may also alleviate some of the problem. 
NEW BUSINESS: 
Dr. Dolocourt: Dr. Teresa Stewart has made contact with Dr. Dolocourt, a pediatric neonatologist at 
Primary Childrens Medical Center, who would like to bring CME conferences to our facility. He 
recommends having a endocrinologist come here first to discuss diabetes. Dr. Dolocourt would also like 
to have us invite the physicians from AVMC to attend. Dr. Ripplinger suggested that Dr. Stewart and 
Geri Nielson work together to get a drug company to sponsor a dinner lecture. Mark Heslop of Lily 
was suggested as a possibility. 
Unassigned Admissions: Dr. Ripplinger asked for clarification of what constitutes an unassigned 
admission. It was his understanding that if a patient names a physician, that physician was to be called 
and not the physician on call for unassigned admissions. It is the consensus of the staff that Dr. 
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Ripplinger's understanding is cornet. Also discussed was the fact that many times the physician on call 
leaves town without obtaining coverage for his shift. Dr. Buxton moved to fine the physician who does 
not find coverage $100 each time they miss their call time. Dr. Mark Mitchell made a second to the 
motion and the motion carried. 
ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT: 
Brad reported that utilization was down for the mondi but with the increase usage of outpatient services, 
we were able to stay in the black. 
The medical office building is scheduled for completion in mid September. The possibility of having 
a retail pharmacy in the building is being discussed. Also being discussed is a waiting area near die ER 
which will help the problem of visitors wanting to go into the ER. 
Brad reported that Dr. Thomas Allred, a physician dual-boarded in pathology and emergency medicine 
had come to us about relocating to this area. Dr. Hardy announced that his contract with Columbia has 
been extended to six years instead of the original two to three years. He said he is strongly committed 
to providing the best service he could to our facility including spending more time here. He explained 
that he is in the process of looking for an individual who would ftee up some of his time to allow greater 
coverage for us. Dr. Hardy expressed concern about another pathologist joining our staff. He stated it 
would be very expensive for the hospital to equip, supply and staff the lab for a full time pathologist. 
He also felt there was not enough work for a full time pathologist. Dr. Hardy then excused himself from 
the meeting. 
There was a lengthy discussion on the possibility of Dr. Allred joining the staff. Dr. Buxton felt that 
we needed to go beyond a CV to make sure the physician will fit in with the staff. Dr. Evans stated that 
having a physician in the community benefitted not just the hospital but the community as a whole. Dr. 
Stewart stated that he felt Dr. Hardy was doing a fine job but having a pathologist on staff would 
increase our pathology services. Brad also pointed out that we did need help in the ER and Dr. Allred 
is willing to supplement his income in that way. Drs. Ripplinger, Buxton and Mark Mitchell expressed 
their support of Dr. Hardy. Dr. Allred will be invited back to the facility to give everyone a chance to 
meet him. Brad also stated that if any member of the staff wanted to make telephone inquiries regarding 
Dr. Allred, he would provide names and telephone numbers of his references. Dr. Buxton felt we did 
not need a full time pathologist and that if we needed help in the ER, we should look at Dr. John 
Masaryk who has expressed an interest in returning to the staff. Dr. Masaryk does not want to relocate 
to the area but would consider commuting from the Wasatch Front. Staff will be notified of Dr. 
Allred's next visit. 
Meeting adjourned. 
Exhibit C 
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July 18, 1996 
Uintah Basin Medical Center Board Room 
PRESENT: 
EXCUSED: 
Harry Fieldsted, Gordon Snow, Gayle Young, Dr. 
Wayne Stewart, Gail Hamilton, Curtis Dastrup, Smiley 
Arrowchis, Bradley D. LeBaron, Ray Hussey, 
Laurel Cranney, Marilynn Duncan 
Dr. Hal Mitchell, Owen Van Tassell 
CALL TO ORDER: Harry Fieldsted, Chairman; 7:00 p.m. 
Minutes! 
The minutes of the June 1996 Board of Trustees Meeting were approved upon a 
motion by Gail Hamilton with a second by Gordon Snow. Voting was 
unanimous. 
Qualify Assuranra and Safety Report: 
Laurel Cranney gave the Quality Assurance and Safety Report. It was noted that 
deliveries for the first quarter of 1996 were 93 and 79 for the second quarter of 
1996. Total deaths were nine for the first quarter and 12 for the second. Deaths 
in the Emergency Room were two for the first quarter and eight for the second. 
There were 25 emergency patients in each quarter who were transferred to 
another acute care facility. There were 25 inpatients transferred for services not 
provided by the hospital in the first quarter and 32 in the second. Ongoing 
projects include the diabetic project and also the OB project. Home Health, OBf 
and ICU have all made recent changes due to information collected for quality 
assurance. The Clinic has a plan in place and is collecting data. There were 30 
patient complaints regarding the Emergency Room in 1995, particularly dealing 
with the way patients feel they were treated. This area deserves looking into. 
There were a total of 69 complaints in 1995 wherein the hospital was contacted 
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with 3,000 discharged patients. The nursing staff is currently calling patients 
after their discharge to follow up and do further educating. A motion to accept 
the Quality Assurance and Safety Report was made by Gayle Young and was 
seconded by Gail Hamilton, Voting was unanimous. 
Building Committee: 
Gordon Snow reported on the activities of the Building Committee and reviewed 
the building cost matrix. The anticipated date for completion of the new medical 
office building is still the middle of September. Very few subcontractors have 
been brought in from outside the Basin, and the Construction Supervisor has been 
quite pleased with the work of our local people. A shipment of windows were 
recently received and, upon the review of Chris Cooper, were determined to be 
below Cooperfs standard. They were subsequently replaced with another 
window which had moldings to match the existing building. This was done at 
considerable expense to Coopers and demonstrated commendable integrity. 
The Board gave the Building Committee an assignment to review space for a 
Medical Staff library and to address the request made by Drs. Buxton and White 
to remain in their existing clinic rather than moving to the new medical office 
building. These items required a review of all existing space and yielded the 
following suggestions: 1) There are nine spaces in the new medical office 
building and we will utilize 7 xh with Dr. Teresa Stewart, Dr. Mark Mitchell, 
Dr. Hal Mitchell, Drs. Morrill, Ripplinger, Smith, Brilliant, and visiting 
physicians. 2) The Obstetric Clinic (Evans building) will accommodate Dr. 
Evans and Callie Webb, leaving room for a new obstetrician as one is recruited. 
3) In the East Clinic (Buxton Building) will be Drs. Buxton and White, Bonnie 
Crozier and Administration. 4) In the Surgical Clinic (Indian Health) will be 
Orthopaedics, Pathology, General Surgery and the Medical Staff Library. 
It was noted that Cooper's bid includes all the millwork for the medical office 
building. 
UB276 
Board of Trustees Meeting Minutes 
July 18, 1996 
Page 3 of 10 
A motion to accept the Building Committee Report was made by Gail Hamilton, 
seconded by Smiley Arrowchis, and voting was unanimous. 
Human Resources: 
Dr. Wayne Stewart, Chairman of the Human Resources Committee, reported that 
Representative Beverly Evans recendy met with the committee and understands 
the hospital's situation regarding our involvement in the State Retirement Fund. 
She indicated that in our efforts to opt off the plan, we should gain the support of 
the Board and the County Commission then obtain the understanding of the 
Governor. The Governor can give a strong recommendation to the Retirement 
Board. Representative Evans expressed her willingness to attend all the meetings 
we desire her to attend. The Board in the June Board Meeting voted to pursue 
whatever steps are necessary to opt off the State plan. A meeting is scheduled 
with the County Commission on July 30 at 3:00 p.m. to discuss this matter. An 
updated study from Peterson & Associates revealed the same trends as the initial 
study, demonstrating a need to choose another retirement program in order to 
maximize our benefits to both employees and the hospital. 
A motion was made by Gail Hamilton and seconded by Wayne Stewart that the 
State be approached as oudined by Representative Evans and asked that wc be 
allowed to opt off the State Retirement plan. Voting was unanimous. 
Beverly Evans suggested that Bob Linnell be invited here with representatives 
from the County Commission, the Board and Administration. Employees could 
be involved on the task force. This meeting could conceivably be held on the 
same day representatives from the Governor's office come to meet with the 
County. 
A motion was made by Curtis Dastrup and seconded by Smiley Arrowchis to 
accept the Human Resources Report as given. Voting was unanimous 
Chief of Staff Report: 
In Dr. Hal Mitchell's absence, Dr.Wayne Stewart reported on Medical Staff 
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activity. Dr. Hardy and a pathologist who joined him came to Medical Staff 
Meeting regarding their proposal to put a pathologist in the Basin, Appreciation 
was expressed to Dr. Hardy for what he has done for our facility. This 
information is being considered in relationship to Dr. Thomas Allred joining our 
facility as a Pathologist/ER physician. The Medical Staff took no formal action 
regarding the matter. Dr. Allred has received highly complimentary references 
from those people called regarding his capabilities and character. Dr. Allred 
would be at the hospital full time and has asked that he be paid a clinical lab 
directors fee of $2,000 a month plus a percentage of billing. For the same type 
of service, Dr. Hardy works eight hours a month, and we pay him $400. Dr. 
Allred also desires, for the first year, to work four shifts per month in ER. The 
overall cost to us would be $2,000 a month and the costs involved in setting up 
an anatomical lab which would cost approximately $10,000 in capital expense. 
He will bring about $70,000 worth of equipment with him to install in our 
building. Dr. Allred is desirous of moving to Roosevelt and making his home 
here. 
A motion was made by Gordon Snow that we give Dr. Hardy 90-days notice as 
per his contract and offer Dr. Allred an invitation to join our facility. The 
motion was seconded by Gail Hamilton, and voting was unanimous. 
A motion to accept the Chief of Staff Report was made by Gayle Young with a 
second by Curtis Dastrup, and voting was unanimous. 
Financial Reportz 
The Financial Report was made by Gayle Young and Ray Hussey. Inpatient 
Days, Admissions and Surgeries were down for the month. We also had fewer 
Births. Revenue was down and so were Operating Expenses. There was a 
combined loss for the Clinics of $17,000. We had a Net Gain for the month of 
June of $76,000. Ray Hussey indicated we are billing more quickly on accounts 
and after four months of nonpayment, turning the account to collections so we 
don't have an accumulation of long-standing, over-due billings. The current 
trend is almost two to one outpatient over inpatient services. It was reported that 
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due to not having a provider in the Duchesne Valley Medical Clinic, revenue 
there had dropped and $4,000 was lost for the month* There is a Year-to-Date 
Gain on the Clinics of $9,000. A motion to accept the Financial Report as given 
was made by Smiley Arrowchis, seconded by Curtis Dastrup, and voting was 
unanimous. 
Charity Care Policy: 
The Charity Care Policy had been distributed earlier to the Board for their 
review. It was pointed out that the Charity Care Policy is an opportunity to let 
people feel good about themselves rather than classifying their account as bad 
debt, if they meet the charity care criteria. A motion was made by Gordon Snow 
and seconded by Dr. Wayne Stewart to adopt the Charity Care Policy as 
outlined. Voting was unanimous. 
Hospice: 
There is a great deal of excitement regarding our hospice program which was 
recently granted licensure from the State. Jan Roberts is supervising this 
program, and we should have Medicare approval in approximately six weeks 
Durahle Medical Equipment: 
Discussion was held regarding the possibility of purchasing equipment from 
Mountain Air Gas to buy tanks, equipment to fill our own oxygen tanks, and 
liquid oxygen equipment. We would be able to acquire an interest-free loan for 
three years with a 16-month pay off for equipment. We would realize a savings 
of $21,000 per year. There are currently ten patients on the liquid oxygen 
program. A motion was made by Gail Hamilton to invest $50,000 into the 
purchase of oxygen equipment. This motion was seconded by Dr. Wayne 
Stewart, and voting was unanimous. 
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Administrator's Report: 
Radiology: 
Commendations were extended to our Radiology Department for the high rating 
they received from the American College of Radiology regarding our ultrasound 
program. This is the first year we have sought this rating, and it is very valuable 
to the department in showing employees and the public that the care they get here 
in ultrasound is the very best 
IHC Contract: 
The Managed Care Committee met and reviewed the contract from IHC on the 
establishment of BasinMed. Since that time, we have had discussions with Blaine 
Benard who indicated he is not comfortable with several items as they are 
presented. Ray Hussey reported on some basic philosophical items noting that 
over time, changes have occurred from the position of the Memorandum of 
Understanding. We have sought repeatedly to maintain a community basis for 
our plan with us maintaining administrative duties. A clause in the contract states 
that this responsibility will be ours upon joint approval by us and IHC. In 
discussions with EHC, they have indicated that we may never have administrative 
control. Regarding pricing, it was pointed out that our desire was to sell the 
insurance for a bit less initially then later offer more of a discount through risk 
sharing. The prices have come in at 10-20% less, and we are not in a very good 
position to be competitive later. If we only can raise the price later, it will not be 
favorable for our community. If we sell for more now, we don't get the extra 
money, IHC does. Concerns were also expressed regarding the marketing and 
sales of BasinMed. The individual enrollment card has a very small insignia of 
BasinMed, and the booklets donft mention our name. We also want to be 
involved with agents in establishing the program. IHC has retracted our 
involvement and has announced that SelectMed is in the Basin. When the agent 
sells, we are only providing care for less money. Ray Hussey suggested that we 
research what it would take to get our own license. We could then lease the 
SelectMed network, do the underwriting and market by our own rules. We are 
getting into managed care, doing our own utilization review, and are taking the 
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right steps in the right direction. Blaine Benard recommends not signing the 
contract until we are comfortable with it. A motion was made by Dr. Wayne 
Stewart that we not accept the contract with IHC as it is now and that 
Administration pursue the desired course and sign only when the contract is 
acceptable. Gail Hamilton seconded the motion, and voting was unanimous. 
Draft Documents: 
Draft Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws for the PHO have been prepared by 
Blaine Benard using information from Sierra View from California. If the 
physicians could review these documents and come to a consensus, there would 
be strength in having the organization in place when we meet with Blue Cross 
Blue Shield. These documents formalize the organization; they do not put 
policies and procedures into place. Legally, we should not represent the 
physicians in a negotiating capacity until the PHO organization is in place. The 
PHO should negotiate as a single entity, not as the IPA and hospital. The IPA is 
doing final reviews and it was suggested that concerns should be addressed 
through an ad hoc committee, perhaps an extension of the Managed Care 
Committee, with any Board Member being invited to participate. A motion was 
made by Gail Hamilton and seconded by Dr. Wayne Stewart that we take another 
month to get prepared and ask the Medical Staff to be ready with their 
organization by next Board Meeting. Voting was unanimous. 
Blue Cross Blue Shield: 
Brad LeBaron asked for clarification in details for negotiating with Blue Cross 
Blue Shield. Discussions were held with the School Board and Administration 
regarding Blue Cross Blue Shield contracts. We have sent a letter to Blue Cross 
Blue Shield that we will go off the panel unless we can agree upon renegotiating 
the contract. Through Board direction in the past, we have said we won't give 
anyone a better discount than we give ourselves. 
Medical Staff iy.yp.lopmp.nf; 
In our recruitment efforts for an additional Pediatrician, we have no viable 
options at this time. We are seriously pursuing another provider for Obstetrics. 
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Dr. Brilliant has indicated he will look somewhere else if an MBA program is 
not available through USU this Fall. 
Duhranp, Valley Medical Clinic,: 
Although we had made an offer to Gene Toole, P.A., which he had accepted for 
a position at the Duchesne Valley Medical Clinic, he has not proven to be 
honorable in his dealings with us. He was scheduled to start on July 1 at the 
DVMC but didn't come nor did he call us. Dr. Pehrson has been helping out in 
the clinic. He also came with a proposal to provide service for the clinic. The 
feeling of the advisory board of the clinic was that they wanted someone to live 
in the community. Roger Marett has talked with Duane Draper, P.A. IN Alaska, 
who has given notice on his job there and will come on August 12. Dr. Pehrson 
came with a second proposal to oversee the clinic and sign off for the P.A. Dr. 
Pehrson will provide full coverage on Monday and Friday for specific hours and 
will work later if patients are coming or appointments are made. The P.A. will 
cover Altamont and Tabiona Monday and Friday and will work on Tuesday and 
Thursday at DVMC. He will work a 12-hour shift in ER on Wednesday and also 
do another shift in Altamont. This would give Monday, Wednesday, Friday 
coverage in Altamont; Monday and Friday coverage in Tabiona; physician 
coverage Monday and Friday and P.A. coverage Tuesday, Wednesday and 
Thursday at DVMC. We can cover all the clinics this way. Dr. Hal Mitchell 
has indicated that if Dr. Pehrson is willing to make a larger commitment, then he 
should be given the opportunity to do so. Dr. Smith has also given notice that he 
won't be going to Altamont. 
Duane Draper, P.A., will receive $52,000 a year, his housing, benefits and 
mileage plus some ER shifts. 
Outpatient Pharmacy: 
We are currently getting reports on medical systems, shelving and layouts for the 
outpatient pharmacy. We are also recruiting a pharmacist. We will be talking 
once again with Don Truman and Bob Benson next week. They would like to 
hear our offer for buying their pharmacy business. We feel $100,000 to 
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$120,000 is a top offer for what Basin Pharmacy has. Several options for 
pharmacists were discussed with salary ranges from $50,000 to $75,000 
annually. 
ARCH Directorship! 
Mark Dalley, who has significant experience in hospital management, comes to 
ARCH as the new Director. Next Tuesday, a strategic planning meeting will be 
held. Mark Stoddard's group has been invited to join in this discussion process. 
Funding for ARCH runs out in September of next year. The question remains as 
to whether we are going to be financially able to keep the organization viable. 
The only revenue generation is the $5,000 paid by each member hospital in 
annual dues. Frontier Recovery is a separate service which generates between 
$50,000 and $60,000, a great portion of which is at our expense. 
Mileage Policy: 
Brad LeBaron presented to the Board a policy regarding mileage reimbursement 
for meetings relating to Board service. This policy will allow for Board 
members to submit a form for meetings attended in addition to the regularly 
scheduled monthly Board Meeting. This will not mean another stipend over the 
one received by the Board for the monthly meeting. 
Answering Machines/Fay Machines; 
Due to the difficulty experienced in contacting Board Members on numerous 
occasions, a discussion was held regarding the purchase of answering machines 
and/or fax machines as a better means of communication between the hospital 
and the Board. 
Advertising: 
Concern has been expressed over the marketing impact Ashley Valley is making 
with ads on TV and the radio. Brad LeBaron and Kyla Allred met with Josh 
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Graham, marketing and advertising consultant, who has been commissioned to 
put together an advertising campaign for us. 
Harry Fieldsted, Chairman 
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Uintah Basin Medical Center 
250 West 300 North 75-2 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Bradley D. LeBaron, Administrator 
(801)-722-4691 
Fax (801) 722-9291 
July 29, 1996 
Leo W. Hardy, MD 
R(X 795 
Price, UT 84501 
Dear Dn Hardy, 
As a followup to our telephone conference of July 26, 1996 and pursuant to the 
terms of our agreement dated November 29, 1994 item #11 which allows for a 
90-day termination period, I am hereby giving you notice of termination of our 
contract effective October 29, 1996, 
This same section of our contract allows for a shorter length of termination by 
mutual consent. In our phone conversation, you agreed to work out the 90-day 
termination period. 
On behalf of our Board, Medical Staff, and patients, I offer our sincere 
appreciation for your services to our hospital and patients. 
Sincerely, 
Bradley D. LeBaron, CHE 
Administrator 
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2000 WL 1875876 
- N.E.2d -
(Cite as: 2000 WL 1875876 (111. App. 1 Dist.)) 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently 
available. 
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN 
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE 
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL 
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION 
OR WITHDRAWAL. 
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District. 
Barry J. CANNIZZO, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
BERWYN TOWNSHIP 708 COMMUNITY 
MENTAL HEALTH BOARD, John 
Valtierra, Mary 
Contini, Michael Leoni, William 
Woynowski, Joseph Carlisi, William 
Karmia, 
Sandra Stillo, Karin-Abdel Hak, Robert 
Pechous, and Samuel "Sonny" Stillo, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 1-99-3558. 
Dec. 22, 2000. 
Former executive director of township 
community mental health board brought 
breach of contract claims against the board, 
relating to his termination for 
insubordination. The Circuit Court, Cook 
County, James F. Henry, J , granted board's 
motion to dismiss. Former executive director 
appealed. The Appellate Court, Quinn, P.J., 
held that as a matter of first impression, the 
executive director's employment contracts 
were ultra vires and void ab initio, though 
board members had staggered terms of 
appointment, because the contracts extended 
beyond the term of the township supervisor in 
office at the time of the execution of the 
contracts, and the board was appointed by the 
supervisor. 
Affirmed. 
[1] Pretrial Procedure <©=* 679 
307Ak679 
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[1] Pretrial Procedure <S=* 686.1 
307Ak686.1 
A motion to dismiss that raises affirmative 
matter to defeat the claim admits the legal 
sufficiency of the complaint, and thus, all well-
pleaded facts in the complaint are taken as 
true. S.H. A 735 ILCS 5/2-619(aX9). 
[21 Pretrial Procedure <S^622 
307Ak622 
[2] Pretrial Procedure <®=*624 
307Ak624 
The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to 
provide a mechanism to dispose of issues of 
law and easily proved issues of fact, and the 
cause of action should not be dismissed on the 
pleadings unless it is clearly apparent that no 
set of facts can be proved which would entitle 
a plaintiff to recover. S.H. A. 735 ILCS 5/2-619. 
[3] Appeal and Error <S=> 893(1) 
30k893(l) 
A trial court's granting of a motion to dismiss 
is subject to de novo review. S.H.A. 735 ILCS 
5/2-619. 
[4] Municipal Corporations <§^ 232 
268k232 
Township community mental health board 
that had staggered terms of appointment for 
its members could not agree to employment 
contract for board's executive director that 
extended beyond the term of the township 
supervisor in office at the time of the 
execution of the contract, where the board was 
appointed by the supervisor. S.H.A 60 ILCS 1/ 
5010(a); S.H.A. 65 ILCS 5/8-l-7(b); S.H.A. 405 
ILCS 20/3a, 20/3b, 20/3e(jXc). 
151 Municipal Corporations <§=> 57 
268k57 
A township may exercise only those powers 
conferred upon it by statute. 
[6] Municipal Corporations <S^ 232 
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It is contrary to the efifective administration of 
a political subdivision to allow elected officials 
to tie the hands of their successors with 
respect to decisions regarding the welfare of 
the political subdivision. 
[7] Municipal Corporations <§=» 149(2) 
268kl49(2) 
[7J Municipal Corporations <§=* 232 
268k232 
Where a township board appoints an officer or 
contracts for services, and the duties of the 
officer or the services to be rendered are duties 
delegated to the supervisor of the board, such 
appointment or contract for a period beyond 
the term of the board is not valid. 
[8] Municipal Corporations <&=> 149(2) 
268kl49(2) 
[8] Municipal Corporations <&=> 247 
268k247 
Employment contracts for executive director of 
township community mental health board 
were ultra vires and void ab initio, and not 
merely voidable in part, though board had 
staggered terms of appointment for its 
members, where the contracts extended 
beyond the term of the township supervisor in 
office at the time of the execution of the 
contracts, and the board was appointed by the 
supervisor. S.H.A. 60 ILCS l/50-10(a); S.H.A. 
65 ILCS 5/8-l-7(b); S.H.A. 405 ILCS 20/3a, 20/ 
3b, 20/3e(jXc). 
[9] Evidence <®=> 32 
157k32 
Appellate court could take judicial notice of 
the Township Code, to determine when the 
term of office for township supervisor began 
and ended. S.H.A. 60 ILCS l/50-10(a), 1/50-
15(b). 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook 
County, Honorable James F . Henry, Judge 
Presiding. 
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PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN delivered the 
opinion of the court: 
*1 This action was brought by plaintiff Barry 
Canrdzzo against his former employer, the 
Berwyn Township 708 Community Mental 
Healith Board (hereinafter the Board), and 
various members of the Board individually. 
The counts of plaintiff's complaint relevant to 
this appeal alleged breach of contract against 
the Board. The Board filed a motion to dismiss 
those counts of the complaint, contending that 
the Board had no authority to enter into the 
employment contracts at issue and thus, the 
contracts were void ab initio. The circuit court 
granted the Board's motion to dismiss and 
plaintiff timely filed his appeal. For the 
reasons that follow, we affirm. 
On or about October 16, 1989, plaintiff was 
hired as the executive director for the Board. 
In that capacity, plaintiff's responsibilities 
included various administrative and financial 
duties. Plaintiff served as the executive 
director for the Board until he was terminated 
for insubordination at an emergency meeting 
of the Board on June 26, 1996. 
In the spring of 1993, plaintiff entered into a 
written employment contract (hereinafter the 
1993 contract) with the Board. The 1993 
contract was for a term of three years 
commencing July 1, 1993. The 1993 contract 
set forth duties, as well as the rate of 
compensation, and provided that if neither 
party gave notice of an intent to terminate the 
contract by April 1, 1996, the contract would 
renew for an additional three-year period. The 
1993 contract was signed by plaintiff on April 
19, 1993, and by both the president and the 
secretary of the Board on May 17, 1993. 
Approximately one year later, plaintiff 
submitted another employment contract 
(hereinafter the 1994 contract) to the Board. 
The terms of the 1994 contract mirrored those 
of the 1993 contract, except for the dates. The 
term of the 1994 contract was effective from 
July 1, 1994, to June 30, 1997, and it would 
renew for an additional three years unless one 
of the parties gave notice of an intent to 
terminate by April 1, 1995. The 1994 contract 
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was signed by plaintiff on June 20, 1994, and 
by the president of the Board on September 
19, 1994. 
On June 25, 1998, plaintiff filed a six-count 
complaint alleging breach of the 1994 and 
1993 contracts against the Board (counts I and 
H) and various tort claims against other 
individual defendants (counts HI through VI). 
The individual defendants moved to dismiss 
counts III through VI on various grounds, 
including defenses under the Local 
Governmental and Governmental Employees 
Tort Immunity Act, (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. 
(West 1996)). The circuit court dismissed 
counts IH through VI with prejudice, and 
plaintiff does not appeal the dismissal of those 
counts. 
The Board also filed a motion to dismiss 
counts I and II of plaintiff's complaint under 
section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure, ( 
735 ILCS 5/2- 619(a) (West 1998)). First, the 
Board argued that it never authorized, voted 
on, approved or accepted the 1994 contract. 
Second, the Board argued that it did not have 
authority to enter into either of the contracts, 
rendering each ultra vires and void ab initio. 
The Board based its second argument on the 
notion that the life of any community mental 
health board is a maximum of two years, due 
to the staggered terms of its members. Thus, 
the Board asserted that any contract with a 
duration longer than two years would extend 
beyond the term of the board that entered into 
the contract and would be invalid. In support 
of its motion to dismiss, the Board attached a 
copy of its constitution and bylaws and copies 
of the minutes of the Board's meetings on 
June 20 and September 19,1994. 
*2 In his response to the Board's motion to 
dismiss the complaint, plaintiff argued that 
there was a factual dispute as to whether the 
1994 contract was authorized and approved by 
the Board, which precluded granting 
defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff also 
argued that the Board had the authority to 
enter into three-year contracts because the 
Board was a "continuing body" and could 
enter into contracts of any reasonable length. 
In support of his arguments, plaintiff attached 
his own affidavit and affidavits from the 
Board's president and the Board's secretary at 
the time of the execution of the contracts. 
Plaintiff also attached a partial transcript of 
the meeting of the Board on September 19, 
1994, and a newspaper article regarding 
plaintiffs employment contract. 
On July 2, 1999, the circuit court granted the 
Board's motion to dismiss counts I and II of 
plaintiff's complaint. The court found that the 
duration of both the 1993 and 1994 contracts 
extended beyond the terms of the contracting 
Boards. The court observed that there was no 
applicable Illinois case law, but found that the 
Board was not entitled to enter into a contract 
with plaintiff for a term extending beyond 
that of its own members. Thus, the court found 
that each contract was void and unenforceable. 
Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal of the 
circuit court's order dismissing counts I and DL 
[1I2][3] A motion to dismiss under section 2-
619 admits the legal sufficiency of a complaint 
but raises affirmative matter to defeat the 
claim. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(aX9) (West 1992). 
Thus, all well-pleaded facts in a complaint are 
taken as true. Grassini v. Du Page Township, 
279 Ill.App.3d 614, 618, 216 m.Dec. 602, 665 
N.E.2d 860 (1996). The purpose of a section 2-
619 motion to dismiss is to provide a 
mechanism to dispose of issues of law and 
easily proved issues of fact, and the cause of 
action should not be dismissed on the 
pleadings unless it is clearly apparent that no 
set of facts can be proved which would entitle 
a plaintiff to recover. Nielsen-Massey 
Vanillas, Inc. v. City of Waukegan, 276 
fll.App.3d 146, 151, 212 m.Dec. 856, 657 
N.E.2d 1201 (1995). A trial court's dismissal of 
a claim under section 2-619 is subject to de 
novo review. Grassini, 279 Ill.App.3d at 618, 
216 m.Dec. 602, 665 N.E.2d 860. 
[4] The primary issue on appeal is whether 
plaintiff's 1993 and 1994 employment 
contracts were ultra vires and therefore void 
ab initio and unenforceable. The Board argues 
that both employment contracts were ultra 
vires because the duration of each contract 
was longer than the terms of the Board and of 
the township supervisor who appointed the 
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Board. Plaintiff argues that the Board had 
authority to enter into the three-year 
employment contracts because the Board is a 
continuous body due to the staggered terms of 
its members. 
[5] A township may exercise only those 
powers conferred upon it by statute. Grassini, 
279 IU.App.3d at 618, 216 IlLDec. 602, 665 
N.E.2d 860. Berwyn Township's powers at the 
times relevant to this case were set forth in 
the Township Law of 1874 (60 ILCS 5/1-1 et 
seq. (West 1992)), which has been repealed and 
reincorporated in large part into the Township 
Code (60 LLCS 1/1-1 et seq. (West 1996)). The 
reincorporation did not change those township 
powers relevant to this appeal; therefore, we 
will refer to the applicable sections of the 
Township Code in our discussion. 
*3 Section 85-10 of the Township Code 
provides that every township has corporate 
powers expressly granted or necessarily 
implied, and no others. 60 ILCS l/85-10(a) 
(West 1996). In Cook County, township 
supervisors are elected in their respective 
townships at the time of the regular township 
election for a term of four years and until 
their successors are elected and qualified. 60 
ILCS l/50-l(Xa) (West 1996). Township 
supervisors enter upon their duties on the first 
Monday of the month following their election. 
60 ILCS 1/50- 15(b) (West 1996). 
The Community Mental Health Act 
(hereinafter the Act) gives the township 
supervisor authority to establish a seven-
member community mental health board to 
administer the Act. 405 ILCS 20/3a (West 
1996). Such board is appointed by the 
township supervisor, with the advice and 
consent of the township board of trustees. 405 
ILCS 20/3a (West 1996). The term of each 
member of the community mental health 
board is four years, provided, however, that of 
the members first appointed, two are 
appointed for a term of two years, two for a 
term of three years, and three for a term of 
four years. 405 ILCS 20/3b (West 1996). 
The Act endows the community mental 
health board with the power to M[e]mploy such 
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim 
personnel, including legal counsel, as may be 
necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act 
and prescribe the duties of and establish 
salaries and provide other compensation for 
such personnel." 405 ILCS 20/3e(jXc) (West 
1996). However, the Act itself does not limit 
the duration of employment contracts or 
explicitly grant the community mental health 
board discretion to assign such contractual 
tennis for itself. We must therefore determine 
whether such a limitation on contract duration 
should be read into the Act. 
We look to the decision of our supreme court 
in Millikin v. County of Edgar, 142 111. 528, 32 
N.E. 493 (1892), for guidance. In Millikin, a 
county board of supervisors employed the 
keeper of a poorhouse under a three-year 
contract, notwithstanding the fact that the 
board members themselves were only elected 
for a one-year period. The governing statute 
granted the county board the authority to hire 
such an employee, but did not expressly limit 
the number of years for which the employment 
might extend. Millikin, 142 111. at 532, 32 
N.E. 493. 
The IVIillikin court reasoned that allowing the 
elected county board to enter into an 
employment contract beyond its own term 
might deprive the county's succeeding boards 
of thei ability to exercise authority over then-
most important functions. Millikin, 142 111. at 
533, 32 N.E. 493. The court then stated that 
the governing statute "should not receive a 
construction which might lead to such 
disastrous results, unless the language 
employed would admit of no other reasonable 
interpretation.w Millikin, 142 EL at 533, 32 
N.E. 493. As a result, the court found that the 
county board exceeded its power in making 
the employment contract and found the 
contract invalid. Millikin, 142 111. at 533, 32 
N.E. 493. 
*4 [6] The decision of our supreme court in 
Millikin stands for the broad proposition that 
it is contrary to the effective administration of 
a political subdivision to allow elected officials 
to tie the hands of their successors with 
respect to decisions regarding the welfare of 
the subdivision. Grassini, 279 Ill.App.3d at 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works ^>"~ 
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Indeed, this concept has been expressed with 
respect to employment decisions in section 8-1-
7(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code, which 
provides in part: 
"Notwithstanding any provision of this Code 
to the contrary, the corporate authorities of 
any municipality may make contracts for a 
term exceeding one year and not exceeding 
the term of the mayor or president holding 
office at the time the contract is executed, 
relating to: (1) the employment of a 
municipal manager, administrator, engineer, 
health officer, land planner, finance director, 
attorney, police chief or other officer who 
requires technical training or knowledge * * 
*.
M
 65ILCS 5/8-l-7(b) (West 1996). 
Consistent with Millikin, the legislature 
recognized in section 8-l-7(b) that certain 
positions are important to the effective 
administration of municipalities, so that each 
succeeding authority, in concert with the 
municipality's chief executive officer, should 
detemiine for itself who should serve in those 
positions. Grassini, 279 Ill.App.3d at 620, 216 
IU.Dec. 602, 665 N.E.2d 860. 
This principle also applies to townships. 
Grassini, 279 El.App.3d at 620, 216 IlLDec. 
602, 665 N.E.2d 860. Section 100-5 of the 
Township Code provides that township boards 
may "employ and fix the compensation of 
township employees that the board deems 
necessary.H 60 ILCS l/100-5(a) (West 1996). 
The appellate court in Grassini interpreted 
that provision to mean that each successive 
township board should decide for itself which 
employees are necessary and what their 
compensation should be. Grassini, 279 
Hl.App.3d at 620, 216 IlLDec. 602, 665 N.E.2d 
860. 
In Grassini, the township entered into an 
employment contract with Grassini in which 
she agreed to serve as township administrator 
for a four-year period. The township's board of 
trustees authorized the contract by resolution, 
and the township electors approved the 
resolution. Shortly thereafter, however, newly 
elected trustees, including a new township 
supervisor, replaced the trustees who 
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authorized Grassini's contract. The new 
trustees then voted to terminate the contract 
and to discharge Grassini from her duties. 
Grassini, 279 IlLApp.3d at 617, 216 Hl.Dec. 
602, 665 N.E.2d 860. 
The Grassini court held that "a township 
board may not contract to employ persons for 
terms greater than the period for which the 
board making the decision has left to serve." 
Grassini, 279 Hl.App.3d at 620, 216 IlLDec. 
602, 665 N.E.2d 860. The court determined 
that because the duration of Grassini's 
employment contract was to extend beyond 
the terms of the township trustees and 
supervisor who authorized it, the contract was 
outside the township's authority and was void 
ab initio. Grassini, 279 Ill.App.3d at 620, 216 
m.Dec. 602, 665 N.E.2d 860. 
[7] The holdings in Millikin and Grassini 
reflect the majority rule that where a board 
appoints an officer or contracts for services, 
and the duties of the officer or the services to 
be rendered are duties delegated to the 
supervisor of the board, such appointment or 
contract for a period beyond the term of the 
board is not valid. Annotation, Power of Board 
to Make Appointment to Office or Contract 
Extending Beyond Its Own Term, 149 A.L.R. 
336, 342 (1944). 
*5 The decisions of other state courts amply 
illustrate the rationale behind this rule. In 
Delaware, the supreme court determined that 
the levy court could not appoint the Director of 
Civil Defense to a term extending beyond the 
term of the levy court itself. Rawlins v. Levy 
Court, 235 A.2d 840, 841 (Del. 1967). The 
Rawlins court found that the term of an 
appointed office, not prescribed by statute, 
expires with the expiration of the term of the 
appointing body. Rawlins, 235 A.2d at 841. 
The court further found that the appointment, 
on the eve of the expiration of the levy court's 
term, was an illegal attempt to deprive its 
successor of the power to direct and control the 
office of the Director of Civil Defense. 
Rawlins, 235 A.2d at 841. 
The Kansas Supreme Court invoked a similar 
test in Zerr v. Tilton, 224 Kan. 394, 581 P.2d 
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364 (1978). There the court stated: 
" 'And the test generally applied is whether 
the contract at issue, extending beyond the 
term, is an attempt to bind successors in 
matters incident to their own administration 
and responsibilities or whether it is a 
commitment of a sort reasonably necessary to 
protection of the public property, interests or 
affairs being administered. In the former case 
the contract is generally held invalid and in 
the latter case valid.' " Zerr, 224 Kan. at 400, 
581 P.2d at 371, quoting State v. City of 
Garnett, 180 Kan. 405, 409, 304 P.2d 555, 
558 (1956). 
Finally, in Wyoming, the state supreme court 
adopted the same principle, stating as follows: 
"[SJubject to only applicable state statutes as 
specifically applied, any contract with a unit 
of government of the state of Wyoming which 
extends beyond the term of office of the 
governmental decisionmakers, * * * can be 
subject to challenge if, in consideration of the 
facts and circumstances, the necessity and 
benefit to the governmental unit did not 
justify the extended term when the 
agreement was made. 
* * * 
* * * 'The true test is whether the contract 
itself deprives a governing body, or its 
successor, of a discretion which public policy 
demands should be left unimpaired.' [Plant 
Food Co. v. City of Charlotte, 214 N.C. 518, 
199 S.E. 712, 714 (1938).] 
* * * 
* * * 'If * * * the contract is for the 
performance of personal or professional 
services for the employing officers, their 
successors must be allowed to choose for 
themselves those persons on whose honesty, 
skill and ability they must rely.' [Pima 
County v. Grossetta, 54 Ariz. 530, 538, 97 
P2d 538, 540-41 (1939).]" Mariano & 
Associates, PC. v. Board of County 
Commissioners of the County of Sublette, 737 
P.2d 323, 329 (Wyo. 1987). 
For an excellent discussion of this issue, see 
J. Griffith, Local Government Contracts: 
Escaping from the Governmental/ Proprietary 
Maze, 75 Iowa L.R. 277 (1990). 
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Plaintiff argues that the majority rule as 
reflected in Grassini is distinguished because 
the case before us involves a board that has 
staggered terms of appointment. Whether 
boards that have staggered terms of 
appointment may agree to employment 
contracts for a period beyond the terms of the 
memt>ers of the board is an issue of first 
impression in Illinois. 
*6 Plaintiff relies on Holtzendorff v. Housing 
Authority, 250 Cal.App.2d 596, 58 Cal.Rptr. 
886 (1967), for the proposition that 
"staggered" boards may contract beyond the 
terms, of their members. However, the statute 
at issue in Holtzendorff specifically granted 
that board the power to hire a secretary and to 
desig]iate the term of employment. In 
contrast, the Community Mental Health Act 
in Illinois is silent on the issue of terms of 
employment. In addition, California case law 
has traditionally permitted appointed boards 
to contract beyond their terms (see Denio v. 
City of Huntington Beach, 22 Cal.2d 580, 140 
P2d 392 (1943)), whereas Illinois has 
specifically forbidden such contracts since 
MilliMn. 
Plaintiff also relies on Daly v. Stokell, 63 
So.2d 644 (Fla.1953), for the proposition that 
when a board has staggered terms, the board 
is a "continuing body" and may contract 
beyond the members' terms. While the city 
commission in Daly did have staggered terms, 
the opinion does not make it clear if the 
members were elected or appointed. In the 
case before this court, the Board that 
contracted with plaintiff was appointed by the 
township supervisor, an elected official. 
In a later opinion, City of Riviera Beach v. 
Witt, 286 So.2d 574, 575-76 (Fla.App.1973), 
Florida's appellate court explained that Daly 
was decided based on the fact that the contract 
at issue was for towing services and was, 
therefore, a proprietary matter. In City of 
Riviera Beach, 286 So.2d at 576, the court 
held that a municipal council could not hire a 
city prosecutor for a period beyond its own 
term because the city prosecutor performed a 
governmental function. 
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Furthermore, in Mitchell v. Chester Housing 
Authority, 389 Pa. 314, 132 A.2d 873 (1957), 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a 
"staggered board,H which was designed so that 
the office of one board member expired each 
year, could not contract to hire a secretary and 
director of services for a term of five years. 
Similar to the Community Mental Health Act 
in Illinois, the relevant statute in Mitchell did 
not address the board's authority to designate 
a term of employment. The Mitchell court 
explained its ruling by stating: 
H[G]ood administration requires that the 
personnel in charge of implementing the 
policies of an agency be responsible to, and 
responsive to those charged with the policy-
making function, who in turn are responsible 
to a higher governmental authority, or to the 
public itself, whichever selected them. This 
chain of responsibility is the basic check on 
government possessed by the public at large. 
A contract which will have the effect of, and 
indeed appears to have been executed with 
the express purpose of, violating this rule 
runs counter to public policy and will not be 
enforced against the public interest.M 
Mitchell, 389 Pa. at 328,132 A2d at 880. 
We believe that Mitchell is the better-
reasoned case. We hold that since the Board is 
appointed by the township supervisor, the 
township supervisor's term must be used as 
the time line within which the Board has 
contractual authority to employ persons in 
positions which are important to the effective 
administration of the township. 
*7 [8] As to whether the contracts here would 
be void or only voidable as to portions, 
plaintiff relies on Stahelin v. Board of 
Education, School District No. 4, DuPage 
County, 87 Hl.App.2d 28, 230 N.E.2d 465 
(1967). Stahelin was a case involving a school 
district contracting for the construction of a 
school. The appellate court held that a 
municipality could not gain an 
"unconscionable advantage" over the other 
party by raising the defense that the contract 
was void. Stahelin, 87 Ill.App.2d at 42, 230 
N.E.2d 465. However, the contract involved in 
Stahelin was a construction contract and the 
appellate court held that the school board had 
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to pay for the construction work that had 
already been performed. Here, plaintiff was 
paid for the work he performed Plaintiffs 
complaint is that he was not allowed to 
continue his employment. Thus, Stahelin is 
inapposite to this case. 
Plaintiff also relies on Elk Grove Township 
Rural Fire Protection District v. Village of 
Mount Prospect, 228 Dl.App.3d 228, 170 
ni.Dec. 113, 592 N.E.2d 549 (1992), and Ad-
Ex, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 207 fll.App.3d 163, 
152 Ill.Dec. 136, 565 N.E.2d 669 (1990), to 
support his position that a municipality can be 
estopped from arguing that a contract is 
unenforceable where the contract was not void 
ab initio. However, the contracts at issue in 
each of those cases were found by the 
appellate court to be ultra vires and void ab 
initio. Elk Grove, 228 fll.App.3d at 233, 170 
m.Dec. 113, 592 N.E.2d 549; Ad-Ex, Inc., 207 
Ill.App.3d at 175, 152 Ill.Dec. 136, 565 N.E.2d 
669. 
The Board relies on Metropolitan Water 
Reclamation District Greater Chicago v. Civil 
Service Board of Metropolitan Water 
Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, 291 
fll.App.3d 488, 225 ni.Dec. 795, 684 N.E.2d 
786 (1997), for the proposition that an estoppel 
argument is not available to plaintiff because 
he was an individual contracting with a 
municipality. In Metropolitan, this court held 
that "persons dealing with municipal 
corporations are 'charged with the knowledge 
of the limitations of the power of that 
corporation for any contract attempted to be 
entered into by any of its officials.' n 
Metropolitan, 291 Ill.App.3d at 494, 225 
ni.Dec. 795, 684 N.E.2d 786, quoting Lindahl 
v. City of Des Plaines, 210 m.App.3d 281, 290, 
154 flLDec. 857, 568 N.E.2d 1306 (1991). 
The Board also relies on Jordan v. Civil 
Service Comm'n, 246 Ill.App.3d 1047, 186 
Ill.Dec. 903, 617 N.E.2d 142 (1993), where a 
contract with a municipality that contained an 
unauthorized provision regarding overtime 
payment was held to be void ab initio. The 
Jordan court held that the promises made to 
the plaintiff in the contract on behalf of the 
city were erroneous and that Illinois law does 
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not require that the city be held responsible 
for the impact of the erroneous promises. 
Jordan, 246 IlLApp.3d at 1051, 186 m.Dec. 
903, 617 N.E.2d 142. 
We refuse to expand the contracting power of 
an appointed community mental health board 
beyond the powers of the township supervisor 
and board of trustees that appointed such 
board. As stated above, a township board may 
not contract to employ persons for terms 
greater than the period for which the board 
and township supervisor making the decision 
have left to serve. Similarly, we hold that the 
Board, as an agency of the township, does not 
have the authority to enter into employment 
contracts with administrative personnel that 
extend beyond the term of the township 
supervisor holding office at the time the 
contract is executed, in accordance with the 
cases cited above and public policy as reflected 
in section 8-l-7(b) of the Illinois Municipal 
Code. We hold that such contracts are ultra 
vires and void ab initio. 
*8 In applying this holding to the facts in the 
instant case, it is clear that the executive 
director for the Board was to be directly 
involved with the administration of the Board. 
Consequently, the Board was not authorized to 
contract for such services that extended 
beyond the term of the town supervisor in 
office at that time. 
[9] The term of Berwyn's township supervisor 
in office at the time both contracts were 
executed was four years. While the record 
before this court does not indicate on which 
dates the applicable term or terms of the 
township supervisor began and ended, this 
court can take judicial notice of the Township 
Code that the township supervisor of Berwyn 
began a four-year term in the spring of 1993. 
Under the 1993 contract, plaintiff was to 
serve as executive director of the Board from 
July 1, 1993, to June 30, 1996. However, this 
contract also provided that if neither party 
gave notice of an intent to terminate the 
contract by April 1, 1996, the contract would 
renew automatically for an additional three-
year period. This automatic renewal provision 
Copr. ® West 2001 No Claim 
extended the term of the contract to June 30, 
1999, more than two years after the township 
supervisor's term ended in the spring of 1997. 
As the contract was for services involved in 
the administration of the Board that extended 
for a duration longer than the term of the 
township supervisor in office at the time of the 
execution of the contract, we find that the 
1993 contract was ultra vires and void ab 
initio. We note that even were we to find this 
automatic renewal provision to be severable, 
the first three year period was to end on June 
30, 1996. Plaintiff was terminated by the 
Board on June 26, 1996, a mere four days 
earlier. We affirm the dismissal of count II of 
the complaint, based on the alleged violation 
of the 1993 contract. 
As to count I, based on the alleged violation 
of the 1994 contract, we also affirm the trial 
court's order of dismissal. The 1994 contract 
was to be effective from July 1, 1994, to June 
30, 1997, a period of time exceeding the term 
of the township supervisor in office at the time 
of the execution of the contract. We find that 
the 1994 contract was also ultra vires and void 
ab initio . The 1994 contract similarly 
provided that if neither party gave notice of 
an intent to terminate by April 1, 1995, the 
contract would automatically renew for an 
additional three years, ending on June 30, 
2000. This renewal clause provided that if the 
Board failed to give notice of its intent to 
terminate the 1994 contract within 6 1/2 
months after the contract was entered into, 
the Board would be bound to employ plaintiff 
for more than three years after the township 
supervisor's term in office had expired. This is 
precisely the type of employment contract that 
was decried by the courts in Millikin and 
Grassini. 
For Ithe reasons stated, we affirm the order of 
the circuit court granting the Board's motion 
to dismiss counts I and II of the complaint. 
*9 Affirmed. 
GREIMAN and THELS, JJ., concur. 
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